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Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social
Welfare: The Case of Housing
Nestor M. Davidson

t

INTRODUCTION

Privatization has become a permanent and increasingly significant fixture
on the landscape of contemporary public policy. Federal, state, and local
governments now turn to the private sector for everything from collecting
neighborhood garbage to assisting in the occupation of Iraq. As Martha Minow
recently noted, "a sea change is at work," with "[p]rivate and market-style
mechanisms.., increasingly employed to provide what government had taken
as duties."1 Nowhere is this trend more pronounced, and contested, than in the
privatization of social welfare. In that arena, privatization's potential to harness
the experience, efficiency, and diversity of the private sector sharply clashes
with the risk to accountability raised by private-sector provision of public
services.
Commentators concerned with capturing privatization's benefits and
muting its potential harms often call for additional government control of
private providers through their contractual agreements, specifying in evermore-careful terms the scope of the engagement and monitoring providers with
ever-greater oversight. In this view, privatization is best approached through
contracts that are "clear, thorough, accurate, and unambiguous." 2 These
prescriptions reflect an adversarial model of privatization analogous to classical
discrete contracting in private law. The model presumes that the parties to the
agreement are one-time players, bargaining outside the larger legal and social
context in which their interaction occurs, and capable of capturing the key
variables of their engagement in relatively complete terms.
Conceptualizing privatization through this discrete-contracting lens,
however, understates the fundamentally relational nature of many of the
t Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. J.D., Columbia Law School, 1997;
A.B., Harvard University, 1990. The author wishes to thank Bill Callison, Laura Dickinson, Clare
Huntington, Bill Kelly, Bob Kenison, Sarah Krakoff, Stewart Macaulay, Jon Michaels, Ngai Pindell,
David Reiss, Alice Ristroph, Peter Salsich, Pierre Schlag, Amy Schmitz, Phil Weiser, Charles
Wilkinson, and Leonard Zax for their insights, and Joshua Mack and Keely Ambrose for their excellent
research assistance. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the
Law and Society Association.
1. MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 3 (2002).
2. E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 188 (2000).
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agreements that define public-private partnerships. In many forms of
privatization, the long-term and repeat nature of the interactions between the
parties shape their agreements, reflecting the inherent uncertainties that
accompany a complex and intertwined relationship that can last for decades.
Recognizing privatization as a relational phenomenon shifts the locus of
efficiency and accountability efforts from contractual specificity and
enforcement to encouraging flexibility and fostering mutual responsibility for
program goals.
To explore this relational phenomenon and its implications, this Article
examines the contracts and other modes of control that shape the relationship
between the government and private providers in a collection of important
affordable rental housing programs. Subsidized housing provides a fertile field
of examination because policymakers, program managers, and private
providers have been tinkering with the structures of privatization in that context
for decades, yielding a number of insights into how structures of interaction
have emerged.
A close study of those programs reveals a core of relational contracting
features that discredit models of privatization predicated on conceptions of
discrete contracting. The agreements recognize in myriad ways the long-term
and inherently uncertain nature of the public-private interaction, and they
accordingly often frame critical provisions in flexible terms with mechanisms
for the parties to adjust to changing conditions on an ongoing basis. These
agreements, however, often take a limited approach to relational norms, in that
they respond to uncertainty not by sharing risk and providing for the mutual
adjustment of terms over time, but rather by reserving discretion to the
government.
Recognizing the relational, yet at times imbalanced, nature of these
agreements yields prescriptions that seek to foster reciprocity and solidarity on
the part of private providers. Tempering some measure of governmental
discretion, or creating mechanisms to balance the parties' adjustments over
time, may enhance the benefits of engaging the private sector in service
provision, and may also provide alternative means to address threats to
accountability. By rewarding fidelity on the part of private actors to the public
values involved in services traditionally provided by the government, a
relational approach can harness private incentives in the long run in a way that
reinforces, rather than undermines, important public law norms. In various
contexts other than privatization, relational contracts scholars have recognized
the value that strategies of mutual commitment can bring to the long-term
governance of contractual relations. These insights have direct relevance to the
theory and practice of privatization.
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews current trends in
privatization, outlining concerns of efficiency and accountability at the core of
contemporary discussions of privatization. Part I then examines prescriptions
for increased contractual control of private providers, arguing that such
prescriptions overstate the extent to which privatization may reflect a discrete,

rather than relational, contracting paradigm. Part II then turns to subsidized
housing to illustrate the alternative paradigm of relational contracting,

discussing common contractual and regulatory mechanisms that frame publicprivate interactions in that context. Turning from the descriptive to the
prescriptive, Part III argues that there are advantages that a more relational

approach might bring to privatization. Part III concludes with notes of caution
about a relational contracting approach to privatization and suggests some
responses to these concerns.
Ultimately, this Article seeks to make two contributions to the literature on

privatization. First, it uncovers the relational features that can be found
throughout agreements that shape government-provider interactions in one
significant area of social welfare policy. Second, on a normative level, the

Article argues that shifting the focus in privatization from discrete contracting
to collaborative governing norms can improve the quality and responsiveness
of the privatized service, while providing an alternative approach to preserving
public

values. 3

Examining

in

depth

what

Jody

Freeman

calls

the

3. Arguments for collaborative approaches to governance are increasingly appearing in the public
law scholarship. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 364-65 (2004) (arguing that longdominant regulatory models are giving way to a broad-based "governance" model that seeks to
transform legal control into a "dynamic, reflexive, and flexible regime"); Jerry L. Mashaw, Structuringa
"Dense Complexity": Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law, in ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP: THE REFORMATION OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 6-8 (Philip P. Frickey &
John F. Manning eds., 2005), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss6/art4/ (discussing
contemporary scholarship focused on decentering hierarchical, state-based processes of accountability).
Variations on the general argument that cooperation may have advantages over strict contractual control
in privatization have been made in the public management literature. See, e.g., Peter Frumkin, After
Partnership:Rethinking Public-Nonprofit Relations, in WHO WILL PROVIDE?: THE CHANGING ROLE OF
RELIGION IN AMERICAN SOCIAL WELFARE 198, 198 (Mary Jo Bane et al. eds., 2000) (arguing that
"[r]ather than working toward tighter oversight and more programmatic control ... public management
should move ... toward strategies that promote more sectoral autonomy"); see also KIERON WALSH,
PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS: COMPETITION, CONTRACTING AND THE NEW PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT 40-44 (1995) (discussing relational contracts in privatization). Urban economist Elliott
Sclar has argued for relational contracting in privatization from an economics perspective, focusing
generally (and skeptically) on municipal services. See ELLIOTT D. SCLAR, YOU DON'T ALWAYS GET
WHAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 121-28, 130-50 (2000). As applied to
privatization, however, the embrace by some public law scholars of alternatives to traditional commandand-control approaches has yet to incorporate in depth the insights of relational contracts theorists who
have long explored the dynamics of long-term, intertwined interactions. Similarly, the public
management and economics literature has not explored in detail the formal and informal mechanisms
through which a relational approach to privatization might occur, particularly in social welfare policy.
This Article begins to fill those gaps.
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"uncomfortable interface of public law norms and private law principles" 4 thus
clarifies our theoretical understanding of privatization and sheds important light
on improving its practice.5
I. PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNANCE

Privatization, a hearty policy and scholarly perennial, is currently enjoying
a significant resurgence of attention. This Part describes this trend, particularly
in social welfare policy, and reviews concerns of efficiency and accountability
that drive current debates about privatization. Examining the argument that
careful contractual crafting is a critical tool to promote privatization's benefits
and mitigate its risks, this Part argues that such claims overemphasize a
discrete-contracting framework. It concludes with the theoretical case for an
alternative framework grounded in relational contracting.
A.

The Promise and Perilof Privatization
1.

The Rise of Governing by Network

"Privatization" holds a number of conceptually distinct meanings. At the
highest level of generality, the term encompasses any devolution of public
responsibility to private parties, 6 and internationally it often refers to the sale of
state-owned enterprises. 7 In the United States, however, privatization generally
refers to private-sector provision of traditionally publicly provided goods and
8

services.

4. Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 207 (2000).
5. See Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, in
RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 331, 368 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999);

Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1437 (1996) ("By debating and analyzing how competing
norms-specifically, the norms of efficiency and social justice-are instantiated in legal institutions,
legal scholarship can advance our collective understanding about how these institutions function, how
they create and implement the law, and what they mean for our society in a way that no other discipline
can duplicate."); see also Janna J. Hansen, Note, Limits of Competition: Accountability in Government
Contracting, 112 YALE L.J. 2465, 2469 (2003). As to the focus of this Article-long-term contractual
and regulatory relationships between government agencies and private service providers-the literature
is meager. Cf JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION

AND EMPOWERMENT 90 (1996) (stating that privatization "has exploded, but research and evaluation
studies are still quite scarce").
6. See Ronald A. Cass, Privatization:Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 456-62
(1988) (providing a typology of variations on the meaning of privatization); see also SAVAS, supranote
2, at 104-05 (providing a hierarchy of privatization arrangements, from "most privatized" to direct
governmental provision).
7. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Private Provision of Public Goods: Principles and Implications, in
A FOURTH WAY? PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW MARKET ECONOMIES 95

(Gregory S. Alexander & Grazyna Skapska eds., 1995). Privatization as divestiture is operative to some
extent in the United States, but less so than in many other countries given the lack of a domestic
tradition of nationalization.
8. John Donahue distinguishes this prosaic form of privatization---changing the type of entity
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All levels of government are increasingly employing private entities to
undertake functions traditionally performed by the public sector.9 Contracting

out and close variants have become important policy tools in everything from
the delivery of municipal services 10 to international military operations and
foreign aid.1" As Paul Verkuil points out with concern, it is becoming
increasingly challenging to identify core government functions that cannot be
performed by private parties. 12
While by no means a new phenomenon, 13 privatization has accelerated in
recent years. 14 As it is emerging, privatization reflects what Stephen Goldsmith
and William Eggers recently described as "governing by network,"' 15 with
governments replacing traditional core management structures with networks of
public and private organizations.' 6 At the federal level, for example, those
employed through grants and contracts outnumber civil servants by at least four
to one.

17

delivering a public good or service-from the arguably broader shift from public to private financing.
See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 7 (1989).
Donahue argues that the combination of public financing and public sector delivery encompasses much
of what has traditionally constituted governmental action, while private finance and private delivery
constitute much of what traditionally constituted the private sector. Privatization as a phenomenon can
include shifting delivery, financing, or both to the private sector. Id.
9. See Steven J. Kelman, Contracting, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
GOVERNANCE 282, 287-88 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002) (noting that contracting has been a part of
government since the beginning of the Republic, and that contracting has increased apace with the
growth of government); DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 4-5.
10. See DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 131-33.
11. See Laura Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of
Accountability Under InternationalLaw, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135 (2005); Jon D. Michaels,
Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional,Democratic, and Strategic Problems with Privatizing War,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001 (2004).
12. See Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization of Government Functions, 84
N.C. L. REV. 397, 420-21 (2006); see also Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional
Limits on Privatization,46 AM. J. COMP. L. (Supp.) 481, 482 (1998) ("It is hard to identify any function
that, as a constitutional matter, has been characterized as inherently public.").
13. See Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of
ContractingOut and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 863-90 (2000)
(discussing the twentieth century history of privatization at the federal level).
14. See Freeman, supra note 4, at 161-63.
15. STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM D. EGGERS, GOVERNING BY NETWORK: THE NEW SHAPE OF
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 6-7 (2004); see also H. Brinton Milward & Keith G. Provan, Governing the Hollow
State, 5 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 3-4 (2003), available at http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/
reprint/10/2/359 (discussing the network metaphor for public administration in social services
privatization). Goldsmith and Eggers's discussion of public management is part of the literature on the
New Public Management movement, an important aspect of which is managing private providers. See
generally SAVAS, supra note 2, at 318-20 (discussing the New Public Management movement and the
role of privatization in the collection of reforms that generally fall under that heading); E.S. Savas,
Privatizationand the New Public Management, 28 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1731, 1736 (2001).
16. See GOLDSMITH & EGGERS, supra note 15, at 9-14.
17. See Guttman, supra note 13, at 863 (citing PAUL LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 1
(1999)); see also John J. Dilulio, Jr., Response, Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1271, 1273 (2003) (noting that for every federal civil servant, there are more than six workers
employed in the "proxy" government-state and local governments administering federal programs as
well as for-profit and nonprofit entities).
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Nowhere is this trend more pronounced than in social welfare policy. The
private sector has long played an important role in providing health care,
education, welfare, job training, housing, and other social services.' 8 As early
as the late nineteenth century, local governments were contracting with private
entities to supply social services, in some cases for the bulk of their povertyrelief efforts.' 9 And most significant federal social welfare programs have
201
included some measure of public-private partnering-sometimes a great deal.

As with government services more generally, privatization in social welfare

is increasing in prevalence. 2 Social services privatization has been a hallmark
of welfare policy since the 1996 Welfare Reform Act2 and the concomitant
shift at the state level to private providers. 23 States are likewise turning to

vouchers for education, 24 and privatization is at the heart of the current
administration's focus on bringing religious institutions to the forefront of
social service delivery.25 This surge in privatization has brought renewed
attention to the practice and increasingly urgent calls for responding to the
threats that some see in the trend.

18. See Arnold Gurin, Governmental Responsibility and Privatization:Examplesfrom FourSocial
Services, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE 179, 179-84 (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J.

Kahn eds., 1989); Ruth Hoogland DeHoog & Lester M. Salamon, Purchase-of-Service Contracting,in
TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, at 323. The nonprofit sector, in particular, has long played a
central role in the provision of social services. See LESTER M. SALAMON, PARTNERS IN PUBLIC
SERVICE: GOVERNMENT-NONPROFIT RELATIONS IN THE MODERN WELFARE STATE 34 (1995) (noting

that "in a number of human service fields... nonprofit organizations actually deliver a larger share of
the services government finances than do government agencies themselves"); see also Frumkin, supra
note 3, at 199 (noting that "the nonprofit sector had become by the late 1970s the principal vehicle for
the delivery of government financed human services"); Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in
an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569, 581-91 (2001) (discussing the historical pendulum
swings in public and private provision of welfare services).
19. See DeHoog & Salamon, supra note 18, at 323.
20. See GOLDSMITH & EGGERS, supra note 15, at 10 (quoting DONALD KETTL, SHARING POWER:
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE MARKETS 4 (1993)); Guttman, supra note 13, at 875.

21. See DeHoog & Salamon, supra note 18, at 319-20; see also Gillian E. Metzger, Privatizationas
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1380-94 (2003) (surveying recent trends in privatization and
noting that the trend toward privatization has been "particularly pronounced in social welfare programs
and in government-run institutions").
22. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, 110 Stat. 1936.
23. See Gilman, supra note 18, at 591-94 (discussing privatization following passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996); Sheila S. Kennedy, When Is Private
Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-PrivatePartnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U.
Cfv. RTS. L.J. 203 (2001) (discussing privatization in the wake of welfare reform); Jon Michaels,
Deforming Welfare: How the Dominant Narrativesof Devolution and PrivatizationSubverted Federal
Welfare Reform, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573 (2004).
24. See generally Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2003).
25. See Dilulio, supra note 17, at 1278 (discussing the current promotion of social services delivery
by religious entities); see also Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty
Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1758 (2002) (discussing the Bush administration's push toward
privatizing poverty programs).
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2.

Efficiency andAccountability in Privatization

Despite its ubiquity, privatization remains contentious. Some scholars and
advocates approach privatization from ideological perspectives that cast doubt
on any private provision of public services, or that alternatively assume a
blanket preference for such provision. 26 But commentators are increasingly
accepting the reality of privatization and analyzing the practice from a more
neutral starting point. 27 This pragmatic approach eschews sweeping
generalizations and instead focuses on potential determinants of its success or
failure as a policy tool in practice. 28 Within this pragmatic literature, lines of
discussion have
coalesced largely around concerns of efficiency and
29
accountability.
Exploring these concerns serves two functions in this Article. First, it
provides an evaluative framework through which to examine the governmentprovider relationship. Any governance mechanism-discrete contracting,

relational contracting, or otherwise-must answer to these two different and at
times competing goals. Second, and perhaps more fundamentally,
understanding the current terms of the privatization debate underscores why
commentators tend to prescribe solutions to privatization's challenges that may

be too sanguine about contractual specificity and oversight.

26. For proponents, arguments in favor of privatization can be fueled by a commitment to reducing
the role of government, and privatization becomes another ground for general opposition to state
intervention in modem life. See Paul Starr, The Meaning of Privatization, in PRWVATIZATION AND THE
WELFARE STATE, supra note 18, at 15, 37. Regardless of its particulars, the argument goes, privatization
is a salutary way to shift ever-increasing responsibility for the traditional public realm to the private
sector. The countervailing view holds that private provision of public services creates an irremediable
conflict threatening to hollow government and undermine the rule of law. Under this view, privatization
inherently compromises the public sphere, reducing the deliberative values of government and
destroying citizens' roles in shaping public policy. See generally Mark H. Moore, Introduction to
Symposium: Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1212-13 (2003). While
these arguments help conceptualize the proper spheres of public and private governance, this Article
begins with the fact of privatization and explores privatization given that practical reality.
27. See Jody Freeman, The PrivateRole in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 631 n.368
(2000).
28. Cf Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1285, 1295-98 (2003) (focusing on the pragmatics of privatization). Professor Freeman notes that
scholars focused on the efficiency aspects of privatization, generally from an economics perspective,
tend to ignore the legal and democratic accountability concerns that occupy public law scholars, while
the latter tend not to focus on the cost and quality of the privatized services. Id. at 1290.
29. Matthew Diller argues that for poverty programs, privatization can be described by three basic
accounts: privatization as technocratic advancement (an argument from improved public management);
privatization as a qualitative improvement in the delivery of services (an argument from the nature of
private providers); and privatization as "stealth big government" (an argument that privatization
facilitates increased public support for anti-poverty programs despite conservative opposition). See
Diller, supra note 25, at 1743-51. In my typology, the first two of these arguments are efficiency-related
arguments, while the third is an argument that falls outside of the internal debate about privatization,
representing a variation on the anti-government strain of privatization advocacy.
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a. The Efficiency Case for Privatization
The primary pragmatic argument in favor of privatization rests on private
providers' purported comparative advantages over public entities and
consequent potential to deliver higher-quality services at lower cost. 30 Although
discussions of these potential gains use various labels, for present purposes we
can call this set of arguments the efficiency case for privatization.
In somewhat reductionist terms, the efficiency case begins with the
perception that private providers are more nimble, better able to respond to
changing conditions, and free from the constraints of supposedly rigid public
bureaucracies. 3 1 Market mechanisms, in this view, discipline wayward private
firms and create an incentive structure for the private sector that is impossible
to replicate for public entities. 32 The public nature of government actors thus
tends to yield rigid rules and procedures, without the discipline to perform
optimally.33 A separate line of argument emphasizes the potential benefits of
fostering community involvement and drawing34on the diversity of perspectives
and experiences available in the private sector.
35
The efficiency case for privatization, however, is not without its critics.
30. See Cass, supra note 6, at 485-86; Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, Privatization
and Accountability, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1422, 1423 (2003). In discussions about privatization, the term
efficiency is often used in its productive rather than allocative sense. In other words, "efficiency" in this
context generally focuses on the immediate comparative advantages that private parties bring to bear,
and less on the macroeconomic advantages of a wholesale shift to private provision. The concept of
efficiency, it bears noting, is not without normative overtones. See JANICE GROSS STEIN, THE CULT OF
EFFICIENCY 68-69 (2002). This Article focuses on efficiency in the sense of delivering the same or
better service with the same or less public funding. Id.
31. See, e.g., SAVAS, supra note 2, at 111-12; see also DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC

SECTOR 250-79 (1992) (contrasting centralized and decentralized public management structures).
32. See Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 30, at 1424-26. Thus, the argument goes, the fact that
public agencies are not subject to extinction or acquisition creates the "special peril" of "chronic
inefficiency." DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 51; see also Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supranote 30, at 1428.
33. DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 51 (citing ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 24-25 (1967)).
34. See Minow, supra note 24, at 1244-46; see also DeHoog & Salamon, supra note 18, at 336
(discussing the possibility of increased equity and responsiveness in servicing clients, given the ability
of private-nonprofit-providers to tailor services to client needs and to provide services in the
community); Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1209 (2000) (noting the account of
privatization-particularly with community-based nonprofits-as enhancing responsiveness to local
conditions).
35. Perhaps reflecting the unsettled theoretical case for the comparative efficiency of private
providers, little consensus has emerged on the empirical determinants of efficiency gains in privatization
as a general matter. Some scholars have made sweeping claims about the empirical evidence as to the
comparative advantages of private entities in the delivery of public goods. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note
7, at 106 (citing DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 261-66 (1989)) (summarizing approximately
fifty empirical studies and concluding that in over forty of the studies public entities were found to be
"significantly less efficient than private firms supplying the same service"); see also SAVAS, supra note
2, at 167 (reviewing empirical studies of municipal garbage collection, and concluding that contracting
out was more efficient than public provision); cf Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 30, at 1429 (noting
that a review of the empirical evidence on the privatization of state-owned enterprises "confirmed that
private actors economically outperform public agents in the provision of goods and services" (citing
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Assumptions about comparative incentives and organizational form that
underlie the efficiency case, for example, may be missing key elements of
privatization in practice. 36 Examining municipal services, Elliott Sclar has
argued that in evaluating privatization, one must recognize that market
information is generally incomplete, competition is often lacking, and market
participants are complex organizations instead of the paradigmatic wealthmaximizing individuals of the traditional microeconomic story. 37 And because
the standard efficiency case for privatization generally rests on the ability of the
government to return to the market-to re-bid at regular intervals-the
rationale may break down where there are barriers to market development or to

the ability of participants to evaluate the costs of contract formation and
oversight. 38 For Sclar, whether privatization yields efficiency gains turns on the
information available to the government about the service to39be rendered and
the government's ability to put that knowledge into operation.

Sclar's argument has clear relevance to many areas of social welfare
privatization. Providers of many social services have no clear analogue in the
private sector and operate in markets where re-bidding poses serious practical
challenges.40 The tasks they are called upon to perform are often hard (if not
impossible) to reduce to clear commands, the implementation of which could
be assessed on narrow price and quality terms. Many social service providers,
although by no means all, are motivated by more than profits alone. And in
social services, the public-private relationship can be long-lasting, with
termination often reserved for the .most extreme circumstances, reflecting
(depending on your point of view) the capture of agencies or a benign

William L. Megginson & Jeffrey M. Netter, From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on
Privatization, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 321, 356 (2001))). There is significant reason, however, to doubt the
validity of such sweeping claims. John Donahue's review of the empirical literature, for example,
concludes that the record is decidedly mixed. See DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 57-78. Donahue finds that
private provision may or may not yield efficiency gains depending largely on the nature of the service
contracted out, the relevant organizational structure involved (regardless of whether that structure is
public or private), and market determinants such as the potential for collusion, information costs, and
availability of alternative providers. Id. Similarly, Professor Sclar's review of leading empirical studies
of privatization of municipal services identified a number of methodological and conceptual gaps. See
SCLAR, supra note 3, at 48-49. Sclar's work casts doubts on the proposition that privatization necessarily
improves service provision, and highlights the importance of context and implementation.
36. See SCLAR, supra note 3, at 97.
37. See id. at 47.
38. See id. at 19. Sclar argues that many publicly provided services may have apparent analogues in
the private sector, but given the nature of positive and negative externalities (that is, effects that publicly
provided services have beyond the direct beneficiaries), the comparisons are not perfect. Sclar gives the
example of the U.S. Postal Service and a company like FedEx, arguing that the "service" each provides
is distinct, with the former reflecting public policy goals such as serving rural communities at low costs.
Id. at 22-23. For these reasons, Sclar argues, one cannot simply open the yellow pages and assume that
the market for similar services will necessarily match what is needed for the given public service. Id. at
29, 32.
39. Seeid.at 91.
40. Id. at 125.
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embodiment of a long-term commitment. 41 All of this limits the value of exit
over voice as a means of control.4 2

These conditions challenge the assumptions of the standard case for
efficiency gains in privatization. Prescriptions for achieving the benefits
attendant to private-sector provision therefore have to take a cautious approach
to modes of control that rely on the standard market model. As an evaluative
matter, any approach to the management of privatization should recognize the
particular contours of the efficiency case as it applies in social welfare.43
b. The Risk to Accountability from Privatization
Mirroring efficiency arguments in favor of privatization is a concern,
voiced primarily by public law scholars, that privatization threatens
government accountability to core public law norms. 44 Accountability is a
notoriously slippery concept, serving as what Jerry Mashaw has called a
"placeholder for multiple contemporary anxieties. ' 45 In the context of
privatization, the threat to accountability arguably derives from the very
comparative advantages that private parties are thought to bring to service
provision-freedom from the constraints of governmental action.
Accountability can invoke multiple frames of responsibility. Public
officials, for example, are accountable to the general public, although difficult
and subtle questions can arise as to the relevant "public" to which officials
must respond.46 Within the government, separation of powers and federalism
are accountability mechanisms pitting one branch or layer of government
against another. And within any government organization, there are frames of
accountability focused on the organization's mission, which in the social
services arena includes accountability to recipients. These multiple frames
often lead to significant confusion in discussions of accountability.
Accountability, moreover, can be grounded in different institutional
arrangements. While public law scholars tend to think about accountability in
terms of controlling the discretion of public actors, market mechanisms might
41. See Diller, supra note 34, at 1210 n.454 (quoting HANDLER, supra note 5, at 217).
42. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (discussing means of influencing institutions); Minow,
supra note 24, at 1266-67 (discussing exit, voice, and loyalty in privatization).
43. See SCLAR, supra note 3, at 130-50; see also OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 31; Diller,
supra note 34, at 1173-76 (describing the public administration literature on entrepreneurial
government).
44. See MINOW, supra note 1; see also Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: NonAccountability and Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work
Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559, 1560 (2001) ("Accountability problems multiply because
familiar rules of administrative law do not clearly constrain the new regime of the Contractual State.").
45. See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 15.
46. See Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third-Party Government, in TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, at 523, 524.
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provide an alternative approach to accountability. 47 Market accountability
operates both through the relationship that managers and employees in a firm
have with the owners of that firm, and through the relationship between the
firm and its customers. 48 Some commentators object to conceptualizing market
pressures-to owners (as a function of capital markets) and to customers-as
accountability mechanisms analogous to the constraints of public law, 49 but
these pressures0 at the very least force responsiveness to notions of public
5
responsibility.
Finally, as Mashaw points out, the inherent responsibility to others that
arises in social networks is a third framework for conceptualizing
accountability.5 1 Accountability through social networks arises from what
Mashaw calls "community and culture," with individuals and private
organizations responding to the demands and often unspoken strictures of
52
norms generated by social institutions largely in lieu of state governance.
All of these frames of accountability are implicated to some extent any time
the government employs a private party to deliver goods or services to the
public. 3 The primary concern that public law scholars evince when considering
privatization, however, is the shift away from the tools of public accountability
available when public actors deliver public services.54 While this Article
focuses primarily on the relationship between government entities and their
private intermediaries, other mechanisms of accountability inform the extent to
55
which such fears will bear out.
47. See Moore, supra note 26, at 1225; Mashaw, supra note 3, at 21-24. For an argument that
private actors' comparative advantages (in terms of market discipline and ability to incentivize agents)
are themselves a form of accountability, see Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 30, at 1422-23.
48. See Moore, supranote 26, at 1225-26; Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 30, at 1423.
49. See Mashaw, supra note 3, at 22-23 (citing Richard Mulgan, Contracting Out and
Accountability, AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMrN., Dec. 1997, at 106).
50. See id. at 23. To the extent that the critique of market forces as mechanisms of accountability is
grounded in a normative evaluation of the values to which market actors are held accountable-profit
maximization, for example-it is valid to draw a hard line between public governance and market
approaches to accountability. But it is conceptually possible to harness market-like forces to achieve
public goals, and that shift from the structure to the content of the accountability regime lies at the heart
of alternative approaches to accountability in privatization.
51. Seeid. at24-26.
52. See id. at 25.
53. See DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 38-39, 43-54; SCLAR, supra note 3, at 96-101. Public law
scholars tend to focus on the public governance frame as the most responsive to public values, but the
choice is rarely so singular. David Riemer, Director of Administration for the City of Milwaukee, has
argued that market models of accountability work best when the task to be performed is complex,
focuses on holistic problems, implicates public disagreements about approach, and is amenable to
variations in approach. See David R. Reimer, Government as Administrator vs. Government as
Purchaser:Do Rules or Markets Create Greater Accountability in Serving the Poor?, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1715, 1725 (2001). While one can quibble with Reimer's criteria, the important point is that
various mechanisms may work better or worse in specific contexts, and easy generalization must be
avoided.
54. See Freeman, supra note 28, at 1302-06 (discussing public law perspectives); Moore, supra
note 26, at 1212.
55. See Freeman, supra note 27, at 664-73 (discussing aggregate modes of ensuring accountability).
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Turning, then, to the government-provider relationship, Martha Minow has
usefully outlined the accountability threat potentially posed by private-sector
delivery of public services. First, privatization may undermine legal protections
grounded in norms of equality and freedom that attach to state action. 56 Minow
has acknowledged that defining the precise content of applicable public law
norms can be a ground of significant contention. 57 Whatever the specific
contours of the relevant values, however, using private actors not subject to
traditional
state action constraints challenges the public's ability to protect such
58
values.

Second, privatization raises a potential structural mismatch between private
incentives (particularly where for-profit entities are involved) and public
goals. 59 Thus, for Minow, certain public goods, such as education, are
fundamentally resistant to the information feedback mechanism of the market
lauded by advocates of privatization, and determinants of success and failure
are beyond the scope of direct competition. A variation on this concern with
incentives is the argument that privatization can at best lead to agency capture
and at worst be a directly corrupting influence on the
public sector, as public
61
gain.
private
of
temptations
the
to
exposed
actors are
Finally, turning to private forces to deliver public goods "risks diminishing
experiences of commonality and fomenting tension and distrust across groups
already experiencing religious or ethnic tension." 62 Ultimately, this carries the
potential to create a de-legitimized "hollow state, ' 63 as greater involvement by
private parties in the provision of social services undermines
our collective
64
capacity "to imagine and participate in a public realm."
Although privatization has the potential to raise these normative concerns
56. See Minow, supra note 24, at 1246.
57. See MINOW, supra note 1, at 144.
58. Minow's proposals for core public values include individual freedom of belief and expression,
government neutrality toward religion, freedom from discrimination, provision for basic human needs,
respecting pluralism, and democracy. See id. at 146-50. As Minow acknowledges, any list at this level of
generality is "contestable both as generally articulated and as interpreted in particular contexts." Id. at
146. However the political and legal process arrives at the appropriate set of governing norms, in this
view, such norms are threatened when private parties are the instrument of providing government
services.
59. See Minow, supra note 24, at 1249. Some commentators have framed this concern in terms of
the incentives that the private sector has to manipulate the terms of contracts to privilege profit over
services. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 23, at 631-33.
60. Minow, supra note 24, at 1249-53.
61. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 11, at 164.
62. See Minow, supra note 24, at 1253.
63. For an extensive review of the arguments that privatization has the potential to undermine the
legitimacy of the state, see Milward & Provan, supra note 15.
64. Minow, supra note 24, at 1254. Paul Verkuil focuses on the closely related concern that the
increasing prevalence of privatization threatens the legitimacy of the public sector given the unique role
that government employees play in upholding public values (by, for example, swearing to uphold the
Constitution, following conflict-of-interest rules, and working for more than simply material gain). See
Verkuil, supra note 12, at 459.
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across the entire spectrum of government action, concerns about the threat to

public values are particularly sharp in social welfare. 65 Where services such as
housing, welfare, and education are concerned, distributional and other nonefficiency based instrumental concerns are a critical aspect of service delivery.
In other words, if the government service is explicitly designed to alleviate
inequality or serve some other larger societal goal, program design may be less

readily justified solely in market terms. Conversely, given the vulnerability of
populations to be served, concerns about public law norms such as due process

and equality take on
particular urgency when the services at issue focus on
66
combating poverty.
Concerns about accountability and the reach of public law norms, however,
are not necessarily a one-way street. Just as privatization has the potential to

improve the delivery of services under the appropriate conditions, it also carries
the potential to enhance rather than diminish accountability. As Jody Freeman
and others have argued, privatization carries the potential to bring public law
67
norms to traditionally private realms, a process Freeman calls "publicization."
Private actors are increasingly taking on the hue of public entities as the "price
of access" to opportunities to provide public services. 68 For Freeman, the extent

to which privatization should include the imposition of public values turns on
the ease of specifying public goals, the extent of the provider's discretion, the

potential impact on the consumer of the relevant service, and the government's
motivation for privatizing. 69 Thus government should seek to impose public
values on private providers where programs are hard to define contractually,
involve the exercise of discretion, are value-laden, and serve vulnerable
populations.7 °
65. See Freeman, supra note 28, at 1349-50.
66. Within the range of social services, just as there are significant operational differences,
concerns about public values may take on different casts depending upon the context. Housing, for
example, requires careful attention to aspects of equality and fairness in housing location (which has too
often yielded to exclusionary pressures at the local level), the selection of and long-term relations with
tenants, and the transparency of the use of public funds, among others. Given the long-term and
relatively intimate relationship between provider and tenant, housing also requires attention to a more
ineffable quality of respect, a value hard to capture in clear contractual terms regardless of whether a
provider is a public or private entity.
Other areas of social welfare might raise different operational and normative concerns. Substance
abuse and counseling services, for example, or benefits eligibility in welfare and health care raise
variations of concerns about equality, fairness, and transparency, although perhaps as a difference in
degree rather than in kind. And prison privatization, another contentious area of privatization, involves
particularly significant aspects of social control and state power over inmates. See Ahmed A. White,
Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The PrivatePrison in JurisprudentialPerspective, 38 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 111, 145-46 (2001).
67. See Freeman, supra note 28, at 1314-29; cf Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like
Obligationson Private[ized]Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1729-34 (2002).
68. Freeman, supra note 28, at 1285.
69. Id. at 1343-50.
70. Id. at 1349. Freeman also argues that imposing public norms in privatizing public services is a
tool for responding to the potential for governmental avoidance of public law protections, and should be
less of a factor when privatization is more focused on pragmatic goals. Id.
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Any inquiry into whether privatization is a force for eroding or extending
public law norms, then, must focus on the details of privatization in practice.
There are grounds to be skeptical about an inherent conflict between efficiency
and accountability, and it is important to examine instances of privatization in
practice at the level of program implementation.
3.

ContractualControl in the Efficiency/Accountability Debate

If privatization carries the promise of harnessing the creativity and
discipline of the private sector, but risks eroding the core values that define and
constrain public action, identifying the appropriate mechanisms for controlling
private providers becomes a critical question. This is a basic principal-agent
problem, and as John Donahue points out, a government entity's decision to
employ private actors is only one strategy that can be employed to respond to
the potential mismatch between the goals of the principal and the incentives
that shape the actions of the agent. 71 If the government decides to contract out,
however, there are a number of mechanisms generally available to respond to
potential principal-agent problems, including regulation, contracting, increasing
the potential for non-contractual liability (tort or public law-based), and less
formal means of aligning agents' incentives. 72 While all of these tools are
sets the terms of
important, and none operate in isolation, it is the contract that 73
providers.
private
and
government
the
the relationship between
One might ask why the government would choose to define core aspects of
the relationship with private providers through contract even in a minimal way,
74
rather than reserving all discretion to administrative oversight of grantees.
Government entities (or the legislators that mandate contractual obligations by
statute) may simply be seeking the additional remedies that are available when
an obligation is imposed by contract and the ability to tailor an agreement to the
particulars of a given relationship. 75 And having a contract in place creates an

71. See DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 38-39. Directly employing agents is another strategy to lessen
this tension, but privatization reflects a decision (for whatever reason) to employ a contractual strategy.
Id.; see also Kelman, supra note 9, at 305 (discussing contracting versus employment as two alternative
strategies to reduce principal-agent problems).
72. For an overview of various tools in the context of welfare reform, see Gilman, supra note 18.
73. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 24, at 1266-67 (discussing contractual mechanisms for ensuring
accountability to public values in the context of privatization).
74. Cf Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction,
in TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 9, at 1, 1-6 (discussing alternative approaches to structuring
public-private interaction). Certainly in the housing arena, as with other areas of privatization,
significant obligations are imposed on private providers as a condition of receiving funding, and there is
no inherent reason why subsidies could not be delivered through administrative, rather than contractual
means.
75. Cf Gilman, supra note 18, at 635 (discussing contractual remedies). Courts appear increasingly
inclined to hold governmental entities to the essence of the bargain they enter into, absent clear authority
to modify terms. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996); Cienega Gardens v. United
States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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incentive for private providers to make capital and other investments, giving
the government some
measure of influence over the types of entities likely to
76
bid for subsidies.
Given that contracts are a central mechanism of controlling private
providers, both efficiency advocates and public law scholars frequently
prescribe ever-greater specificity in contract design, as well as increased
attention by public officials to the minutiae of contract monitoring. 77 In this
view, greater contractual clarity holds the potential for ever-more-careful
calibration of governmental goals and public oversight. As noted at the outset,
E.S. Savas, a leading proponent of privatization, succinctly summarized this
view with the argument that government contracts "will achieve their intended
79
purpose only if the terms are clear, thorough, accurate, and unambiguous."
This view is widely shared.80

Prescriptions for contractual control are driven by a certain logic. If one
accepts a role for the private sector in social welfare, but remains concerned
that principal-agent disconnect might undermine efficiency or threaten public
law norms, then it is important to have a clear metric for translating public
goals into a discemable framework of delegation, as well as effective means to
ensure that those goals are being met. 8' As Mark Moore has stated, "a

necessary condition for success [in privatizing social services] is a form of
accountability that allows a collective to define its purposes and then to develop

76. On the provider side, contracts provide certainty. The greater the number of variables in the
relationship with the government that can be stipulated by contract, and the greater the capital
investment by the private entity, the greater the ability of the provider to manage the risks inherent in
accepting the subsidy. In housing, as discussed below in Part II, there are a variety of risks associated
with becoming the intermediary of government subsidies, including increased scrutiny of operations,
tenant obligations unmatched in the private sector, and even the potential for criminal liability that
attends receipt of public funds. One important risk that providers seek to manage, however, is the
possibility that the government might, through its regulatory or legislative authority, alter the "bargain"
to disadvantage the provider. See infra text accompanying notes 211-212.
77. See Freeman, supra note 28, at 1350-51 (arguing that "there might be considerable agreement
between the economic and public law views about the importance of clear and enforceable contractual
terms to the success of privatization"); cf MINOW, supra note 1, at 33 ("As drafter of the contracts, and
the piper calling the tune, the government can set extensive and detailed public requirements.").
78. See DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 43-45.
79. SAVAS, supra note 2, at 188; see id. at 188-94 (discussing contractual structures for privatized
services).
80. Elliott Sclar has observed that the "typical reaction to the concept of privatization is the attempt
to modify the arrangement to work more like a classical contract," with ever-clearer terms and evergreater enforcement mechanisms. SCLAR, supra note 3, at 121-22.
81. Cf Judith Welch Wegner, Utopian Visions: Cooperation Without Conflicts in Public/Private
Ventures, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 342-43 (1991) ("Clear standards for defining obligations and
measuring compliance are especially important to provide an adequate benchmark in the event of
financial or political downturns [in public/private ventures]. An effort should be made to anticipate
future problems or changes in circumstances in order to specify at the outset that both current and future
public health and welfare concerns will be addressed. Finally, ample remedies for noncompliance should
be included in the interest of both parties .... These remedies would ensure that government judgment
remains free and independent in the event of noncompliance and that private expectations are fairly
treated in the event of changing political tides.").
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the technical means
for determining the degree to which those purposes have
82
achieved.,
been
However logical these widespread prescriptions might seem, they are
misguided in important respects. First, they assume that the terms of
engagement in privatization can be reduced to clear contractual commands that

capture the essence of the outputs desired by government (whether in terms of
the actual services or in terms of the public values through which those services

are delivered).83 Given the nature of the services at issue in social welfare
policy, however, many aspects of services provided are extremely difficult to
specify in clear output-driven terms. 84 Public law norms such as rationality and
equality, for example, involve complex value judgments in operation that will
elude detailed specification, no matter how prescient or creative the drafter of
the contract.
This view, moreover, looks to the moment of contracting as the critical

juncture in defining the public-private relationship and assumes that the
contingencies that might shape that relationship can be accounted for at the
time of contracting. As a temporal matter, however, the needs of both parties
often cannot be foreseen or specified at the time of contracting, and the external

environment (market, policy, or otherwise) in which services are to be provided
is likely to shift, perhaps significantly, in the long run.
Finally, prescriptions that focus on clearer contractual control assume that
the relationship between the government and the private provider is an
essentially arm's-length transaction, amenable to termination as an important

(if not the most important) remedy for noncompliance. As noted, however, the
relationships that develop in this arena often involve significant investment in
the relationship, long-term subsidies, and significant limitations on the extent to
which deviations from contract terms may be amenable to traditional

82. Moore, supra note 26, at 1225. Likewise, for example, Martha Minow's account of contractual
regimes for accountability depends heavily on the ability of the government both to define the terms of
engagement in a way that does not undermine constitutional or legislative commitments and to enforce
those terms strictly, ultimately with termination. See Minow, supranote 24, at 1267.
83. Moreover, the spiral of contractual specificity and oversight mechanisms creates increasing
costs with ever-diminishing returns. Elliott Sclar described this "contract-fattening" process in the
prison-privatization context:
After each . . . malfunction, such as escapes, brutality, or deaths among prisoners, public
officials step in to write a lengthier contract ... to avoid repetition of the specific abuse that
caused public embarrassment in the first place. Of course, each time more information and
performance standards are demanded, the cost of the contract increases.
SCLAR, supra note 3, at 122.
84. Imposing a contractual obligation that tracks, for example, Fair Housing Act requirements can
draw in the entire range of judicial and administrative interpretations that have evolved to clarify the
nature of such obligations. See Henry Korman, Underwritingfor Fair Housing? Achieving Civil Rights
Goals in Affordable Housing Programs, 14 J. AFFORDABLE HousING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 292, 29597 (2005). And some public law norms, such as tenant procedural rights prior to lease termination, may
be captured in relatively straight-forward terms. But many public law norms are more open-ended and
must be applied in the myriad day-to-day interactions between providers and the public.
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contractual remedies.
In sum, the assumptions underlying prescriptions for tighter contractual
control form what contract theorists would describe as a paradigm of "discrete"
contracts. As we shall see, however, these assumptions do not necessarily hold,
and privatization can generate agreements that are anything but on-off, discrete,
and complete.
B.

Relational Contractingas an Alternative Paradigm

Contracts for easily identifiable and measurable goods to be delivered in the
short term may be amenable to relative clarity, but the practical challenges to
achieving contractual clarity in more complex and long-term interactions are
well documented. 86 The longer the term of the "transaction" captured by the
contract and the more amorphous the "output" to be captured by the contracting

parties, the more challenging the drafting becomes. The recognition of these
conditions has spawned a vast literature on what contracts scholars call
relational contracts. 87 Relational contract theory draws a contrast to so-called

"discrete" exchange-paradigmatically negotiated at arm's length between
strangers, in a spot market, with little or no focus on mechanisms to adjust
contractual relations over time. 88 Discrete contracts attempt to allocate risks
clearly, define reciprocal obligations narrowly, and leave sanctions for breach

85. In the housing context, for example, terminating a subsidy contract may have significant
detrimental effects on the residents of the housing being provided. Agencies do, of course, in extreme
circumstances, sever relations with providers, but the decision to terminate can complicated by the costs
of transition, the impact on beneficiaries, and the investments made by the government in the initial
development of the good or service (in housing, the construction or rehabilitation).
86. See DONAHUE, supra note 8, at 115-18 (discussing, in the context of defense procurement,
contractual complexity arising out ambiguous measures of value, difficulties in assessing need over
time, and conflicting governmental goals (such as secrecy)); see also Steven Cohen & William Eimicke,
Managing Privatization: The Tools, Skills, Goals and Ethics of Contracting (Mar. 10, 2001)
(unpublished conference paper presented to the 62nd Annual Meeting of the American Society for
Public Administration), http://www.columbia.edu/-sc32/managingprivataspa.pdf (outlining challenges
to effective government contracting in privatization).
87. The literature on relational contracts is voluminous, stretching back to the pioneering work of
Macaulay, see Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM.
SOC. REV. 55 (1963), and Macneil, see Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical,Neoclassical, and Relational ContractLaw, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854 (1978)
[hereinafter Macneil, Contracts]; Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV.
691 (1974). See Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristicsand Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94
Nw. U. L. REV. 823, 823-24 (2000) (collecting sources). Contracts scholars dispute the extent to which
relational contracting is a separate and distinct body of law. See id. at 824. Few scholars, however,
would disagree that a relational lens has independent conceptual value in both positive and normative
terms. See Robert E. Scott, The Casefor Formalism in RelationalContract,94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 852
(2000); cf Randy E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of
Contract, 78 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1200 (1992) ("To a significant degree, we are all 'relationists' now.").
88. See Macneil, Contracts, supra note 87, at 862-65. Macneil contrasts relational contracts with
discrete contracts, which he situates in the realm of classical contract doctrine. Neoclassical contract
law, in Macneil's account, incorporates relational features and begins to shift toward mechanisms of
planning and flexibility in adjusting to change. Id. at 884-85.

HeinOnline -- 24 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 279 2006

Yale Law & Policy Review

Vol. 24:263, 2006

as the primary response to changed circumstances. 89 Discrete contracting

typically arises in the realm of low-frequency transactions, with a low level of
asset specificity,90 and relative clarity in the product or service that is the subject
of the contract.
Relational contracts challenge each of these predicates. Providing a single,

coherent account of such agreements in the private-law context is a task that
continues to elude legal scholars, 9' but several relevant themes have emerged in
the literature. As Richard Speidel notes, relational contract theory has both
descriptive and normative dimensions. 92 As a descriptive matter, relational

contracts characteristically tend to extend over a longer period of time than
discrete or classical contracts, involving either repeat interactions between
parties or a single long-lasting agreement. 93 The durational aspect of relational

contracts, although not singularly defining, 94 creates "patterns 95of interaction
and expectation" that transcend the terms of any given exchange.
Relational contracts, moreover, can be distinguished from discrete contracts
in that the former tend to be more "incomplete" and the latter more
"complete." 96 The terms of classical or discrete contracts tend to capture

contingencies with relative clarity-perhaps because the subject of the contract
is relatively simple or the transaction relatively brief.97 By contrast, the more
89. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 737, 739-40
(2000) (discussing the relational-discrete continuum).
90. See SCLAR, supra note 3, at 102. Asset specificity refers to the extent to which investments
specific to a relationship can be transferred to other contexts, a factor that influences the ability of
parties to terminate. In housing, the government makes an investment in subsidizing a specific project,
as does the private provider who builds it; both are reluctant to abandon the project. Providers have
some ability to transfer investments in subsidized assets into market-rate housing, an important problem
in contemporary housing policy, but the transition is by no means cost-free.
91. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
877 (2000) (surveying uncertainty in relational contract theory); see also Ian R. Macneil, Relational
Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483.
92. See Speidel, supranote 87, at 827-28.
93. Id.
94. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1091 (1981) (noting that "long-term contracts are more likely than short-term agreements" to be
relational, but "temporal extension per se is not the defining characteristic").
95. Speidel, supra note 87, at 828.
96. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 36-37 (1996). Relational

contracts are a form of incomplete contracting, characterized by uncertainty, a high-degree of relationspecific investment, and repeat transactions, but relational contracts and incomplete contracts,
theoretically, can diverge at the juncture of governance mechanisms. See SCLAR, supra note 3, at 123.
Sclar draws a distinction between incomplete contracts, which he argues focus on replicating market
governance, and relational contracts, which he argues build on the recognition of the interdependence of
the parties. Id.
97. See SCLAR, supra note 3, at 102. One view of the difference between discrete contracts and
relational contracts in terms of mechanisms of adjustment could track long-standing distinctions
between rules and standards in law more generally. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in
Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685-87 (1976); see also Pierre Schlag, Rules and
Standards,33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 384-90, 427-29 (1985) (criticizing the rules-standards dialectic). On
this view, discrete contracts tend toward rules, while relational contracts tend toward standards, although
the fit is not entirely perfect. Cf William C. Whitford, Relational Contracts and the New Formalism,
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complex or long-standing the interaction 98that is the subject of the contract, the
more incomplete the terms will likely be.
Thus, rather than attempting to define and allocate all risks and obligations
at the outset, relational contracts tend to focus on planning and governance
mechanisms, often through open terms and the allocation of discretion with
respect to potential contingencies to one party or the other, within a framework
of mutual obligation. 99 This lack of specification can be a function of the
transaction costs of memorializing the full range of potential contingencies, the
more so the longer the potential interaction. It can also be a function of the
inherent difficulty-no matter how great the resources for negotiation at the
outset--of anticipating all possible changes over time.100 "Parties to a relational
contract, then, are likely to view the exchange as an ongoing integration of
behavior which will grow and vary with events in a largely unforeseeable
future." 10 '
The terms of relational contracts reflect inherent contingencies and the
inability of contractual specificity to capture accurately the intended allocation
of risk, giving rise to mechanisms of cooperation and the division of the
benefits and burdens of the ongoing relationship. ° 2 In other words, conflict
resolution in relational contracts, most theorists would agree, tends to minimize
03
formal judicial enforcement in favor of various means of self-enforcement.'
Turning to the normative level, relational contract theorists argue that if the
interaction between contracting parties involves long-term commitments and
inherent uncertainties deeply imbedded within a shared social context, then the
contract law that emerges should promote norms of solidarity, reciprocity, and
role integrity. 10 4 Relational contracts, in this view, are grounded in the
recognition that formally structuring incentives to overcome principal-agent
problems is inadequate to manage long-term relations, and engaging the
parties' mutual self interest is an alternative strategy for responding to the
inevitability of change and uncertainty over time. °5 In other words, on an
2004 Wis. L. REv. 631, 639 (discussing rules and standards in the context of relational contracts).
98. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 96, at 37.

99. See id.
100. Individualization of contractual terms, in contexts where one or both parties are repeat players,
also takes resources.
101. Speidel, supra note 87, at 828.
102. See id.
103. See Donald James Smythe, The Role of Contractual Enforcement and Excuse in the
Governance of RelationalAgreements: An Economic Analysis, 2 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 3, 5 (2002)
(citing WILLIAMSON, supra note 96; Goetz & Scott, supra note 94; and Macneil, Contracts,supra note
87), http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss2/art3.
104. See Speidel, supra note 87, at 827. Drawing from Macneil's work, these are norms that
Speidel identifies as holding a long-term relationship together. Similarly, contract law in this account
can reinforce norms that develop over time, such as "supporting cooperation, risk sharing, and
preserving the relationship." Id.
105. See SCLAR, supra note 3, at 123; Christopher Grandy, Can Government Be Trusted To Keep
ItsPart of the Social Contract?:New Jersey and the Railroads, 1825-1888, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 249,
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instrumental level, there are advantages to governing relational contracts in a

way that rewards commitment to the relationship, deters defection, and fosters
06
collaboration.
A greater elaboration of the relevance of relational contract theory to

privatization will benefit from context. 107 As others have noted in discussing
privatization more generally, relational contracting norms hold promise, 10 8 but
the ground-level means of embodying that promise, particularly in the realm of
social welfare policy, remain largely unexplored. It is to such details that we
now turn.
II.

RELATIONAL CONTRACTING IN AFFORDABLE HOUSING

Moving from the abstract to the concrete, affordable housing policy
provides insights into what a relational contracting approach to privatization
might look like. 10 9 Affordable housing policy in the United States maps the full
249-50 (1989).
106. Although these norms are generally targeted toward the relationship-specific investments that
characterize private exchange, they may also apply to more abstract terms in privatization that relate to
accountability-e.g., fealty on the part of private providers to public law norms.
107. Cf Joel F. Handler, ContinuingRelationships and the Administrative Process:Social Welfare,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 687, 691-99 (drawing on Macaulay's work on long-term relationships to posit a
cooperative decisionmaking model of social welfare policy).
108. See SCLAR, supra note 3, at 130-50; Freeman, supra note 4, at 171 (noting that "[n]o contract
can be specific enough to anticipate any and all situations that a private provider might encounter," and
recognizing that "contractual vagueness may be desirable in some circumstances, as, for example, when
the parties are familiar with each other, have been repeat players, and have established trust"); see also
DeHoog & Salamon, supra note 18, at 321 (noting that in the social services arena, because "[t]he
relationships established between the contractors and the government are critical," social welfare often
involves "relational contracting").
109. The legal literature on the privatization of low-income housing focuses on specific policy
concerns, often in the context of privatization through divestiture. See, e.g., Michael H. Schill,
PrivatizingFederalLow Income HousingAssistance: The Case ofPublicHousing, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
878, 884-86 (1990) (discussing the sale of public housing to residents); Note, When HOPE Falls Short:
HOPE VI, Accountability, and the Privatization of Public Housing, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (2003)
[hereinafter Note, HOPE VI]. For an excellent overview of privatization strategies and their
consequences in affordable housing policy, see Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Solutions to the Affordable
Housing Crisis: Perspectives on Privatization, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 263 (1995). While housing
privatization has not generated much attention in the legal literature, the topic has long been a staple of
economic, political science, and public policy scholarship on government involvement in the market for
housing. For prominent examples, see HOWARD HUSOCK, AMERICA'S TRILLION-DOLLAR HOUSING
MISTAKE 13-29 (2003) (arguing broadly against government subsidies for affordable housing); JOHN C.
WEICHER, PRIVATIZING SUBSIDIZED HOUSING (1997); and Peter D. Linneman & Isaac F. Megbolugbe,
Privatisationand HousingPolicy, 31 URB. STuD. 635, 639 (1994). Perhaps the most important policy
concern raised in analyzing housing privatization is a recurring debate about the merits of tenant-based
versus project-based subsidies. See, e.g., Kirk McClure, Housing Vouchers Versus Housing Production:
Assessing Long-Term Costs, 9 HOUSING
POL'Y DEBATE
355
(1998),
available at
http://fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd-0902--mcclure.pdf (arguing that the perception of
a cost premium for project-based strategies overstates the differential by focusing on start-up, rather than
life-cycle, costs); Mark Schroder & Arthur Reiger, Vouchers Versus Production Revisited, I I J.
HOUSING RES. 91 (2000) (criticizing McClure's study); Amy Ellen Schwartz et al., The External Effects
of Place-Based Subsidized Housing (NYU Law Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 05-05, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-720103 (arguing that the economic
literature has ignored significant and sustained external benefits of project-based housing). This Article
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taxonomy of privatization.'1 0 Over the past fifty years, public housing has2
yielded to divestiture,I' supply-side subsidies, vouchers, and deregulation."1
This Article focuses on programs that subsidize privately owned housing
because the long-term institutional mechanisms that develop between public
113
entities and private providers stand out in stark contrast in that context.
This Part provides a framework for understanding the spectrum of
approaches in affordable housing, detailing the public-private interface in a
group of important subsidized housing programs. It argues that clear patterns of
relational contracting can be found at the heart of the public-private interface in
many important housing subsidy programs.
A.

Subsidized Housing in the Public-PrivateSpectrum

In response to persistent, if not unchallenged, 1 4 perceptions of fundamental
failure in the market for housing, 115 policymakers have sought for the better
part of the last century to remedy problems of housing availability, price, and
quality. 116 Direct regulatory approaches include housing codes, zoning, rent
does not address the relative merits of tenant-based versus project-based subsidies, but instead focuses
on implementation of the latter form of subsidy as a representative form of privatization.
110. See Cass, supranote 6, at 456.
Ill. The sale of government assets (Cass's "divestiture," Cass, supra note 6, at 457 & n.28) is an
aspect of the move away from large-scale public housing in a program called HOPE VI. In HOPE VI
developments, government owned and operated housing can be redeveloped in partnership with private
developers (or, more accurately, torn down by the government owner and replaced, in part, by privately
developed housing). See Note, HOPE VI, supra note 109, at 1478-79. This is different, of course, from
the classic divestiture strategy of directly selling a government-owned business to a private party, in that
in HOPE VI, the government generally continues some involvement in the resulting ownership entity
and provides some form of subsidy to the private provider. Divestiture is also a part of the programs that
involve the donation or sale at reduced prices of government-owned housing to private parties, as in the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's ("HUD") Officer Next Door/Teacher Next
Door/Firefighter-Emergency Medical Technician Next Door programs.
112. The recurring movement in housing policy to lower "regulatory barriers" to housing can be
seen as a species of privatization. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., "WHY NOT IN OUR
(2005), available at
BARRIERS TO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING
REMOVING
COMMUNITY?"
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/wnioc.pdf.
113. Subsidized housing stands at the midpoint of the public-private spectrum in housing policy
and involves the most direct and ongoing interaction between public and private entities. This Article
focuses on these programs because they represent more than forty years of practical experience with the
long-term interactions that can form in privatizing social services, providing fertile ground for
examining the assumptions underlying conceptions of privatization. Reflections of the themes explored
in this Article can be seen in other housing privatization strategies, but are clearest where the
government and private providers mutually commit to long-term, project-based subsidies.
114. See, e.g., HUSOCK, supra note 109; see also RICHARD K. GREEN & STEPHEN MALPEZZI, A
PRIMER ON U.S. HOUSING MARKETS AND HOUSING POLICY 135-40 (2003) (noting debates about the
nature of housing market failures with respect to affordability).
115. Typical rationales for public intervention in the housing market include remedying supply
problems that reflect short-term inelasticity (arising from costs associated with site selection, financing,
and construction); restrictions on supply arising from regulations including land use, health and safety,
and tenure protections; remedying the externalities that arise from substandard housing; and noneconomic factors that arise from public preferences for certain fundamental goods. See Schill, supra
note 109, at 888-93.
116. See GREEN & MALPEZZI, supra note 114, at 85-133; William G. Grigsby & Steven C.
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control, and similar policies that impose minimal housing standards, cap prices,
and regulate other aspects of the private housing market. 17 On the other end of
a spectrum of private to public approaches is direct government provision. The

U.S. Housing Act of 19371" initiated a national program of public housing,
using federal funds to build 1(and
later to operate) housing generally owned by
9
local government agencies."
Between the (regulated) market and public ownership stand a number of
hybrid public-private policies.120 On the supply side, 12 the federal government

began subsidizing privately owned and operated housing in the late 1950s with
a first wave of mortgage subsidy and other programs, 122 followed by programs
that included rent subsidies and direct construction support. 123 In the 1980s,
construction and rehabilitation subsidies largely shifted from these older U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") programs to taxbased incentives, primarily the Low Income Housing Tax Credit ("LIHTC")
Bourassa, Trying To Understand Low-Income Housing Subsidies: Lessons from the United States, 40
URB. STUD. 973, 975 (2003); see also MILLENNIAL Hous. COMM'N, MEETING OUR NATION'S HOUSING
CHALLENGES 22-25 (2002), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/mhc/MHCReport.pdf, John M.
Quigley, A Decent Home: Housing Policy in Perspective 3-27 (Berkeley Program on Hous. & Urban
Policy Working Paper Series, Paper No. W99-007, 1999), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/
iber/bphup/working-papers/W99-007/. Broadly speaking, housing policy encompasses for-sale housing
(with the single largest federal subsidy coming in the form of the deduction from federal income taxes
for mortgage interest payments and local property taxes), rental housing, mortgage lending, and other
aspects of the market for shelter. Id. at 24. This Article focuses on subsidies for multifamily rental
housing, a relatively narrow slice of the overall market for shelter, but a central focus of modem policy
in responding to the failure of the market to provide decent and affordable shelter for the poor.
117. See Mary K. Nenno, Changes and Challenges in Affordable Housing and Urban
Development, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 10-11
(Willem Van Vliet ed., 1997). Remedying discrimination in housing markets is also a critical component
of the direct regulatory approach.
118. Pub. L. 93-383, 88 Stat. 653 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000)).
119. See Lynn E. Cunningham, A StructuralAnalysis of Housing Subsidy Delivery Systems: Public
Housing Authorities' Part in Solving the Housing Crisis, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY
DEV. L. 95, 112-16 (2003). The current stock of public housing is approximately 1.3 million units. See
MILLENNIAL HOUS. COMM'N, supranote 116, at 24.
120. See generally Rochelle E. Lento, Federal Sources of Financing,in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 215 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2005); Charles J.
Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949-1999, 11 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 489
(2000), availableat http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/ programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_l 102_orlebeke.pdf.
121. On the demand side, starting in the early 1970s the federal government has subsidized rent
with programs structured generally as a commitment by the government to pay a portion of rents up to a
local fair-market rent, as set by HUD. Federal tenant-based subsidies began in 1974 with a certificate
program (which capped the allowable rent level of eligible housing), adding a voucher program in 1983.
See WEICHER, supra note 109, at 5. In 1998, Congress, in the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility
Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2518, mandated that these programs be consolidated into a
single program.
122. See Orlebeke, supra note 120, at 494; Quigley, supra note 116, at 14. The two primary
mortgage subsidy programs of this era are known as Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236, after the
respective sections of the National Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat. 175 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 17151(d)(3), 1715z-1 (2000)). While these programs are no longer funding new
production, there remains a significant inventory of existing 221(d)(3), 236, and other stock.
123. The programs include project-based Section 8 and Section 202/811 programs. See infra notes
127-128.
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and tax-exempt bonds.124 The stock of privately owned housing subsidized on a
25
project basis currently has at least 1.9 million units.'
These supply-side public-private programs variously involve up-front
grants, direct operating subsidies, and indirect tax-based subsidies. 126 Grant
programs can involve "capital advances" (essentially loans that do not have to
be repaid if the housing continues to meet program requirements), and are often
coupled with ongoing rent subsidies. 127 Subsidies designed to induce
construction or rehabilitation can also focus entirely on lowering operating
costs through rent128 or mortgage subsidies. 129 Finally, the LIHTC provides a
124. Quigley, supra note 116, at 25-26. The LIHTC was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, one goal of which was to eliminate real estate-based tax shelters that Congress felt had given rise
to abuses in the early 1980s. See GREEN & MALPEZZI, supra note 114, at 110. Recognizing the potential
impact on affordable housing production that closing those loopholes might have, Congress opted to
experiment with an explicit tax subsidy instead. In 1993, Congress made the LIHTC program
permanent. See Sagit Leviner, Affordable Housing and the Role of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
Program:A ContemporaryAssessment, 57 TAx LAW. 869, 869 (2004).
125. See MILLENNIAL HOUS. COMM'N, supra note 116, at 24. Other current supply-side subsidy
programs include the HOME Investment Partnership program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12701-12713 (2000),
subsidizing new construction, see 24 C.F.R. § 92.205 (2004), state and local housing trust funds, see
MARY E. BROOKS, HOUSING TRUST FUND PROGRESS REPORT 2002: LOCAL RESPONSES TO AMERICA'S
HOUSING NEEDS (2002), availableat http://www.communitychange.org/shared/publications/downloads/
HousingSurvey2002.pdf, as well as other state sources of financing, see Peter Salsich, State Sources of
Housing Finance, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 120, at
259. Property-tax exemption is another subsidy strategy at the local level, and, in some markets, makes

the difference between viable and non-viable financing structures. See Willard S. Moore, Tax-Exempt
Bond Financingfor New York City Rental Housing, 500 PLI/REAL 601, 605 (2004). For an evaluation of
current federal subsidies, see GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE: COMPARING
THE
CHARACTERISTICS
AND
COSTS
OF
HOUSING
PROGRAMS
(2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0276.pdf.

126. Many privately owned subsidized housing developments participate in more than one
program. It is common, for example, to have projects receive loans derived from tax-exempt bonds and
tax-credit subsidized private equity, as well as direct subsidies through project-based Section 8. It is also
not uncommon for different tenants at the same project to be supported by different subsidies. See, e.g.,
Rubaneko v. Martinez, 2002 WL 2008107 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2002) (describing a building served by a
Section 236 mortgage subsidy as well as a Housing Assistance Payment contract and vouchers).
127. While a number of federal, state, and local programs directly subsidize the construction of
affordable housing, Section 202 (Supportive Housing for the Elderly) and Section 811 (Supportive
Housing for Persons with Disabilities) are among the most significant programs still in operation on the
federal level. Section 202 and Section 811 are named after the relevant portions of the Housing Act of
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-372, 73 Stat. 654, amended by Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701q and 42
U.S.C. § 8013 (2000)). Long-term support covers the difference between approved project operating
costs and a mandatory minimum tenant rent contribution, with tenants contributing the greater of thirty
percent of their adjusted monthly income, ten percent of unadjusted monthly income, or certain qualified
housing assistance. 12 U.S.C. § 1701q(c)(3) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 8013(d)(3) (2000). This rental
assistance is provided through a "project rental assistance contract" that lasts at least twenty years, see
12 U.S.C. § 1701q(d)(2) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 8013(e)(2) (2000), or through Section 8.
128. Project-based Section 8, for example, provides ongoing rent subsidies to private owners
pegged to the difference between what eligible renters are required to contribute and rent levels that
HUD has approved for the community. Although project-based Section 8 is a form of operating subsidy,
the operating subsidy served as an incentive for initial development. Project-based Section 8 is no longer
available for projects not already under subsidy (except for a variation under the tenant-based voucher
program, see 24 C.F.R. § 983 (2005); 70 Fed. Reg. 59892 (2005)), but the program represents a
significant portion of the current assisted portfolio.
129. Programs such as Section 221(d)(3) and (4), see 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (2000); 24 C.F.R. § 221
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federal income tax credit in exchange for an equity investment in affordable
housing,1 30 and bond financing, both private activity volume-cap bonds and
generally used to generate subsidized loans for construction
501 (c)(3) bonds,1 is
31
rehabilitation.
or
In most of these programs, providers tend to compete for limited subsidies,
and these subsidies are often over-subscribed. 132 Once engaged, providers-for

whom, in some instances, a given subsidy represents a fraction of overall
financing-tend to remain within the program for as long as the subsidy
lasts. 133 Private providers accordingly typically make large-scale, relationship(2005), and Section 236, see 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (2000), create incentives for construction (or
substantial rehabilitation) by lowering operating costs through mortgage subsidies. Under Section
221(d)(3) and (4), HUD insures privately provided multifamily mortgages, while under Section 236,
HUD provides payments representing the difference between relevant mortgage-payments (principal,
interest and mortgage insurance premiums) and payments that would be required on a hypothetical one
percent interest-rate loan. See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(c) (2000). Section 236 is no longer subsidizing new
construction, but given the long-term nature of the subsidy represents a significant number of projects
still under subsidy.
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000), enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). Under the LIHTC, state
housing agencies allocate available tax credits to private parties for the acquisition and rehabilitation or
new construction of qualifying properties. To qualify, rental projects must reserve at least twenty percent
of the units rent-restricted and occupied by renters whose income is no more than fifty percent of the
area median or forty percent of the units for renters whose income is no more than sixty percent of the
area median. See Leviner, supranote 124, at 871. The credit is then awarded based on the qualified basis
of a project, discounted by the percentage of the project devoted to affordable housing, and taken over a
ten-year period. Id. at 871-72. In many LIHTC transactions, developers take awarded credits and reach
the capital markets through syndicators who operate as intermediaries to investors. The LIHTC currently
generates roughly $6 billion in equity investment, subsidizing about 90,000 new units per year. See
OFFICE OF POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., UPDATING THE Low

INCOME HOUSING TAx CREDIT (LIHTC) DATABASE: PROJECTS PLACED 1N SERVICE THROUGH 2002, at
vii (2004), available at http://www.huduser.org/intercept.asp?loc=/Publications/pdf/updtlihtc.pdf, Ted
M. Handel & David C. Nahas, Leveraging the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Program, L.A. LAW.,
Jan. 26, 2004, at 23.
131. See Elise K. Traynum, Subsidized Housing (80/20) Programs: Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit and Tax-Exempt Housing Bonds, 489 PLUREAL 139, 152 (2003). Volume-cap refers to the total
amount of private-activity bonds that may be issued every year by all eligible issuers in a state.
However, 501(c)(3) bonds are not subject to this volume cap, but are limited to qualifying uses.
Essential function bonds, for projects owned by public bodies, are also used for tax-exempt bond
financing in affordable housing. Id. While a number of specific state and local bond programs target
housing, the general parameters of the subsidy are set by federal tax law. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 103, 141-50
(2000); see Moore, supra note 125, at 605; Traynum, supra, at 152. In the typical bond program used in
affordable housing, a governmental entity sells bonds on the market, and then loans the proceeds to
qualified private entities, with the resulting development used to secure repayment. See Traynum, supra,
at 152.
132. The limited nature of the subsidies available in some measure shapes a part of the asymmetry
between the government and providers. The fact that only a small fraction of those eligible for
subsidized housing are actually served by the programs in operation shapes the incentives of the
government to ensure private participation. If the government had an obligation to serve all eligible
beneficiaries, the government might have more incentive in structuring the public/private relationship to
maximize participation.
133. As noted below, see infra text accompanying notes 161-165, one area of significant
controversy in housing policy in recent years has been the ability of providers to exit programs, either
before the subsidy ends or at the completion of the original term of the subsidy. That fact reflects the
incentive to take housing to market rates that many subsidized landlords face when conditions change,
but the point here is that providers tend to remain as long as they are required to.
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specific investments in reliance on the subsidy. 134 In other words, where a
provider receives government subsidies and decides to produce housing, that
housing represents a significant investment and one that is explicitly
contemplated to last for a significant period of time. Conversely, the subsidy
mechanisms, even if short-term, represent a form of long-term commitment by
the government. These market realities shape the nature of the issues that are
addressed by contract and regulation, and the practical implementation of the

programs.
Housing is therefore one of the more capital-intensive social services,
requiring significant investment in assets specific to the service. Private

providers can, and do, switch from the affordable stock to market-rate housing,
within the confines of their affordability commitments, but the initial decision
to build or rehabilitate the housing entails significant start-up cost. This level of
capital intensity impacts the length of the subsidy and requires commitment on
both sides of the public-private relationship to preserve the asset over the long
run.

B.

135

The Government-ProviderInterface

In each of the subsidy programs just described, the reciprocal obligations of
government entities and private providers derive from a mix of statutory,
regulatory, and less formal pronouncements, generally embodied in some form
of explicit contract.' 36 Scholars of privatization have given relatively little
attention to the ground-level mechanisms that frame the relationship between
the government and private37providers, but such mechanisms demonstrate
1
important relational features.
134. See GREEN & MALPEZZI, supra note 114, at 86 (discussing public and private roles in the
housing market).
135. This is a ground on which the housing context may not fully translate to other areas of social
welfare policy, but any private delivery of services requires at least some relationship-specific capital
investment.
136. In these programs, projects exist in a web of documentation and regulation that involves
multiple parties-not just a single governmental agency and service provider-and raises issues beyond
the core contractual and regulatory terms under examination here. Indeed, one recurring problem for
private providers involves meeting sometimes inconsistent requirements by multiple funding agencies
involved in any single project. See supra note 126; cf John W. Daniels, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Nowakowski,
Managing the Legal Risks of Providing Both Debt and Equity in Section 42 Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit Transactions, 8 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 81 (1998); Handel & Nahas,

supra note 130, at 25-27 (discussing the prevalence of leveraging of financing sources for affordable
housing development); Peter W. Salsich, Saving Our Cities: What Role Should the FederalGovernment
Play?, 36 URB. LAW. 475, 504 (2004) (discussing the layering of financing for affordable housing). This
Article approaches the programs at issue through the somewhat stylized lens of the single governmental
entity-provider relationship in order to explore the core of that relationship.
137. In all of these programs, the volume of project documents tends to be significant, covering
financing (notes, mortgages, security agreements, etc.), construction or rehabilitation (architectural
agreements, design standards, construction contracting), property management, asset management,
entity formation and form, and myriad tenant-related documents (tenant-selection plans, lease forms,
etc.). This Article focuses on the agreements that form the center of the "bargain" between the
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Flexibility and Discretionin Long-Term Commitments

Contracts at the heart of the government-provider relationship for most
privately owned subsidized housing-generally on standard government
forms' 38 -undergird a hierarchy of authority that includes mechanisms for
providing informal guidance on provider obligations, non-binding and binding
guidance, and formal notice-and-comment regulation. 139 Beyond this programspecific hierarchy, obligations on private parties often attach to government
financing that can be government-wide 140 or tied to a general area of policy, but
not to a specific program. 14 1 The relevant contractual forms-though differing
significantly in their details-share some broad characteristics, and consistent
patterns emerge in terms of how obligations and future contingencies are

addressed. 142
As a threshold matter, provisions appear in several of the program
agreements that allow the government to modify terms over time by changing
background regulations. These provisions give the government explicit
43
authority to amend agreements, deem agreements automatically amended,

government and the provider-defining the scope of a project, the terms of affordability, the terms of the
subsidy and the like. Other documents are important, and in practice project agreements interact to
frame a transaction in complex ways, but it is possible to narrow the analysis to core agreements as a
representative sample.
138. Contracts are built on standard forms promulgated by HUD, state housing finance agencies,
and similar entities, subject in some instances to modest negotiation but rarely wholesale change. In the
HUD programs at issue, the key contractual documents include Housing Assistance Payments contracts
("HAP contracts"), regulatory agreements, and other variations. Except as noted, relevant HUD forms
discussed in this Article are available at http://www.hudclips.org/subnonhud/htn-lfonrms.htm. LIHTC
and bond projects typically involve use or regulatory agreements, which, while not as extensive a
recitation of mutual obligations as HAP contracts, are important nonetheless. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.
§ 42(g)(2), (h)(6), (i)(l) (2000). The actual forms of agreement-what the statute calls the "extended use
agreement"-vary from state to state and are promulgated by state agencies implementing the program.
139. There can be overlap in issues addressed at each level of this hierarchy. For example, fair
housing obligations are typically required by statute, reinforced by regulation, and then made the subject
of contractual obligation on the part of a provider.
140. Examples include the non-discrimination requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, see
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000) (prohibiting exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits of, and
discrimination under federally assisted programs on grounds of race, color, or national origin), and
Drug-Free Workplace obligations, see 41 U.S.C. § 701 (2000) (requiring a drug-free workplace for
federal contractors).
141. Davis-Bacon prevailing wage obligations, for example, are imposed by law in several housing
programs, although not uniformly. See Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3148 (2000); 24 C.F.R.
§ 965.101 (2005) (determining wage rates for HUD purposes).
142. Addressing these broad themes should not obscure the proposition that certain provisions are
clearly more important to each party than others. That is to say, the relative weight that a provider will
give to, for example, the right to exit a program may be significantly different from the weight that
provider might give to provisions that govern more ancillary aspects of long-term ownership.
Conversely, the government may place greater weight on a core of affordability, quality, and soundness
provisions.
143. See, e.g., Fla. Hous. Fin. Corp., Extended Low-Income Housing Agreement § 11 (Sept. 18,
2001), http://www.nhlp.org/html/lihtc/documents/2blFLEUA.pdf [hereinafter Florida Agreement]
(providing that amendments required by the Code and "any final or temporary Treasury Regulations or
Revenue Rulings" are deemed automatically to apply).
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cross-reference legal requirements "as amended," 14 4 or require compliance with
regulations in effect at some future point in time. 145 In the LIHTC context,
clauses that require compliance with section 42 of the Code and the
accompanying regulations are common, 146 suggesting compliance with current

and future statutory and regulatory obligations. These provisions, however
worded, memorialize broad ongoing discretion retained by the government to
change background terms over time.
Similarly, recognizing the difficulty of anticipating all contingencies that
might befall a project in the long run, program agreements generally condition
owner discretion over various events in the life cycle of the project on agency
approval. These functionally critical issues can include conveyance, transfer, or
47
encumbrance of the project or interests in the entity owning the project,
144. See, e.g., Cal. Tax Credit Allocation Comm., Regulatory Agreement: Federal Credits § 13
(Aug. 1, 1997), http://www.nhlp.org/html/lihtc/documents/2cl%20CA%20TCAC%2OReg%2OAgmt%
20FEDREG%202000.doc [hereinafter California Regulatory Agreement]; Ind. Hous. Fin. Auth.,
Declaration of Extended Rental Housing Commitment § 5 (u), (v) (2005), http://www.nhlp.org/
html/lihtc/documents/2c2%20IN%20QAP%202005%2OForm%20P%20Decl.doc [hereinafter Indiana
Declaration]. Compare U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Form HUD-52522B, Housing Assistance
Payments Contract (Aug. 1980) [hereinafter New HAP Contract] (for project-based Section 8 New
Construction or Substantial Rehabilitation projects starting in 1980), and id. § 1.1(g) (referencing the
applicability of regulations beyond the scope of the agreement), with U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
Form HUD-52582A, Housing Assistance Payments Contract (June 1976) [hereinafter Old HAP
Contract] (for project-based Section 8 New Construction projects prior to 1980), and id. § 1.1
(g) (stating
that the contract constitutes the entire agreement between the owner and HUD and that "neither party is
bound by any.., agreements of any kind except as contained herein or except agreements entered into
in writing which are not inconsistent with this Contract").
145. See, e.g., New HAP Contract, supra note 144, § 2.9 (mandating that an owner not terminate
any tenancy or assistance on behalf of any family "except in accordance with all HUD regulations and
other requirements in effect at the time of the termination"); U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Form
HUD-52539A, Housing Assistance Payments Contract, pt. 1 (Feb. 1991), http://www.hudclips.org/
subnonhud/html/pdfforms/52539-a.pdf [hereinafter MR HAP Contract Part I] (for project-based
Section 8 Moderate Rehabilitation projects); id. § 1.4(A) ("The Owner must comply with applicable
HUD requirements, including any amendments of HUD requirements."); U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., Form HUD-90173-B-CA, Project Rental Assistance Contract, pt. 2 (Apr. 1992),
http://www.hudclips.org/sub-nonhud/html/pdfforms/90173bca.pdf [hereinafter 202 PRAC Agreement]
(defining the terms of rent subsidies for the Section 202 and Section 811 Capital Advance programs); id.
§ 2.9 (following MR HAP Contract); Indiana Declaration, supra note 144, § 5(h) ("Developer shall
strictly obey, comply with and observe all laws, rules, regulations and executive orders of all federal,
state and local governments and regulatory bodies, as from time to time amended, which are applicable
to the Development or the Credits available to the Development."); Mass. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev.,
2002 Tax Credit Regulatory Agreement and Declaration of Restrictive Covenants § 8,
http://www.nhlp.org/html/lihtc/documents/2b2%20MA%20LIHTC%2ORestr%2OCov.pdf
[hereinafter
Massachusetts Regulatory Agreement] ("The Owner agrees to comply with any monitoring plan,
guidelines, procedures, or requirements as may be adopted or amended from time to time by [the
Department of Housing and Community Development] in accordance with requirements of the Code or
regulations promulgated thereunder by the U.S. Dept. of Treasury ....).
146. See, e.g., Wis. Hous. & Econ. Dev. Auth., Land Use Restriction Agreement for Low Income
Housing
Tax
Credit
§ 2(d)
(Oct.
2000),
http://www.nhlp.org/html/lihtc/documents/
2b3%20WI%20LURAEXH- 1.pdf [hereinafter Wisconsin Agreement].
147. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Form HUD-92465, Regulatory Agreement for
Insured Multi-Family Housing Projects § 8(a), (c) (June 1977), http://www.hudclips.org/sub nonhud/
html/pdfforms/92465.pdf [hereinafter FHA Insured Regulatory Agreement]; New HAP Contract, supra
note 144, § 2.20 (prohibiting sale, assignment, conveyance or transfer without the prior written consent
of HUD); 202 PRAC Agreement, supra note 145, § 2.22 (same). In the LIHTC context, transfer can be
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refinancing or restructuring finances,
or remodeling, reconstructing or
8
demolishing any part of the project.14
Another variable on the government side that is often the subject of a more
flexible approach is housing quality. Here agreements tend to provide fairly
open-ended mandates that owners provide housing that, for example, is
"decent, safe and sanitary,"' 149 meets minimum property requirements,1 50 or is

of quality comparable to non-subsidized units. 15 1 Agreements also impose
prophylactic measures about property and asset management to ensure that
adequate resources are devoted to the project, or152at least facilitating government
oversight over the adequacy of those resources.
In exchange for affordability restrictions, contracts generally make explicit
the government's obligation to provide the given subsidy and the terms of that
subsidy. 153 For some operational-subsidy programs,1 54 however, agreements

can provide for adjusting subsidies over time in response to changing
conditions. 155 These provisions arguably make the most important aspect of the

conditioned upon notification and the obligation of the new owner to assume contractual obligations.
See, e.g., California Regulatory Agreement, supra note 144, § 14; Florida Agreement, supra note 143,
§ 4(a).
148. See, e.g., FHA Insured Regulatory Agreement, supra note 147, § 8(d). These operative
provisions are then complemented by ongoing oversight mechanisms, such as annual reporting
obligations, see, e.g., New HAP Contract, supra note 144, § 2.6(a) (annual financial reports); 202 PRAC
Agreement, supra note 145, § 2.6(a) (same), agency rights to conduct inspections, see, e.g., California
Regulatory Agreement, supra note 144, § 6 (compliance monitoring); Wisconsin Agreement, supra note
146, § 5(a), (b) (inspection rights), as well as an elaboration of third-party enforcement rights. LIHTC
extended use agreements, for example, are required by statute to allow third-party enforcement. See 26
U.S.C. § 42(h)(6)(B)(ii) (2000).
149. See, e.g., New HAP Contract, supra note 144, § 2.5(a); 202 PRAC Agreement, supra note
145, § 2.5(a).
150. See, e.g., California Regulatory Agreement, supra note 144, app. A (outlining mandatory
physical features).
151. See, e.g., Indiana Declaration, supra note 144, § 5(n); Wisconsin Agreement, supra note 146,
§ 2(i).
152. See, e.g., FHA Insured Regulatory Agreement, supra note 147, § 2 (requiring a reserve fund
for replacements); id. § 12(g) (regulating the deposit of rents and other project receipts); New HAP
Contract, supra note 144, § 2.6(b) (regulating the use of project funds).
153. See, e.g., New HAP Contract, supra note 144, § 1.3 (stating that execution of the contract by
HUD is an assurance that the "faith of the United States is solemnly pledged to the payment" of the
housing assistance under the contract and that HUD has obligated funds for such payments); id.
§ 2.4(a)(1) (providing that the amount of housing assistance payments constitutes the difference between
rents set by the contract and "that portion of the rent payable by the [tenant] as determined in accordance
with the HUD-established schedules and criteria," subject to any change by HUD to program rules); id.
§ 2.7(b)(1) (providing for adjustment of "contract rent" pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 888 (2005)); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1) (2000) (providing that contracts under the program shall establish maximum
monthly rent pursuant to HUD regulation); cf. Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1206-07 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(describing mechanisms for adjusting rent in one project-based Section 8 program).
154. As distinguished from programs such as Section 236, LIHTC, and tax-exempt bond financing,
which set the level of subsidy at the outset.
155. See, e.g., 202 PRAC Agreement, supra note 145, § 2.5(a); FHA Insured Regulatory
Agreement, supra note 147, § 4(c); MR HAP Contract Part I, supra note 145, § 1.8; New HAP Contract,
supra note 144, § 2.7(a) (describing rent adjustments as subject to the maximum housing assistance
authorized by the agreement).
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relationship-the amount of the subsidy-subject to periodic revision.
Some obligations, of course, are spelled out in relatively clear-cut terms.
Program contracts, for example, tend to memorialize and elaborate on program
restrictions on populations to be served and rent restrictions in less flexible
terms. 156 In some instances, the contracts embody choices left to providers as to
the nature of the subsidy, 157 while in other cases contracts specify the number
1 58
of units, income levels, and other details tied to the level of subsidy.
Contracts imposing obligations on owners with respect to verification of tenant
eligibility (vesting primary responsibility with owners to ensure that target
populations are actually served) are likewise generally less flexible, reflecting
that these core obligations are amenable to clear-cut provisions and are unlikely
to change over time. 159
How long a project's affordability restrictions are to last might be thought
of as sufficiently clear and unlikely to change as to warrant straightforward
memorialization. And, in some cases, this is how the term of the restrictions is
treated, simply reciting the relevant period. 160 However, the owners' right to
terminate restrictions by prepaying subsidized mortgages or "opting out" of the
Section 8 program at the expiration of the subsidy contract opens up an area
where the long-term expectations of the parties at the outset have arguably
shifted over time, and has been a significant source of litigation and legislation.
While the Section 221(d)(3) and Section 236 programs contemplated
subsidy periods reflecting the term of the relevant loan (up to forty years), forprofit owners were granted the right to exit the program and terminate
affordability restrictions by pre-paying their loans twenty years after the final
endorsement. 16 In the mid-1980s, Congress began to confront the loss of
thousands of subsidized units by passing a series of statutes that sought to keep
the units in the subsidized portfolio by restricting the right to prepay.162 These
156. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Form HUD-90163-CA, Capital Advance
Program Use Agreement § 3 (June 2003), http://www.hudclips.org/ sub nonhud/cgilpdfforms/90163ca.pdf ("The Project shall be used solely as rental housing for very-low income elderly or disabled
persons."); New HAP Contract, supra note 144, § 2.2(a) (specifying population to be served, crossreferenced to HUD regulatory definitions).
157. For instance, developers in the LIHTC program can choose to reserve at least forty percent of
the units for individuals whose income is sixty percent of the area median or twenty percent of the units
at fifty percent of the area median, see 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(1) (2000), and that choice is then reflected in
the operative agreement.
158. See, e.g., MR HAP Contract Part I, supra note 145, § 1.3 Exhibit A (listing of contract units,
including number and size and applicable initial rents).
159. See, e.g., New HAP Contract, supra note 144, § 2.8(c); Florida Agreement, supra note 143,
§ 3(d).
160. See, e.g., New HAP Contract, supranote 144, § 1.2(a).
161. See Richard B. Peiser, The Fallout from Federal Low-Income Housing Preservation
Programs: A Case Study in Estimating Damages, 10 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 371, 373-75 (1999),

available at http://fanniemaefoundation.org/ programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1002_peiser.pdf; Henry A. Herman,
Comment, Privity: How HUD Avoided Contract Liability Under ELIHPA and LIHPRHA, 30 SW. U. L.
REv. 323, 324 (2001).
162. The Emergency Low-Income Housing Preservation Act of 1987 (ELIHPA), Pub. L. No. 100-
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statutes generated significant litigation from owners challenging Congress's
right to restrict prepayment rights, culminating in a series of decisions in the
163

Cienega Gardens litigation, first finding no contractual liability for HUD, 164
grounds.

but later holding HUD liable on Fifth Amendment Takings

Congress eventually reversed course and reinstated the right to prepay, creating

keep owners in a number of
instead a voluntary incentive regime designed to 65
provisions.
affordability
long-term
with
programs
For LIHTC projects, there has been less controversy over the term of
providers' obligations, but agreements required by state housing finance
agencies do in some instances extend affordability restrictions beyond what is
statutorily required. Despite the fact that the tax subsidy runs for a ten-year
period, by statute the use agreement's restrictions must remain in place for at
least thirty years, 166 and some states require or create incentives for longer
periods. 167 For bond programs, regulatory agreements are required to impose
affordability and other restrictions during the "qualified project period," which
under the Code must be at least fifteen years from the date that at least half the
residential units are occupied. 68 Bond-related regulatory agreements tend to
track the statutory requirement.

Public norms-related obligations

that program agreements embody,

particularly in terms of equality and due-process-grounded fairness norms, vary

242, 101 Stat. 1877 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 17151 (2000)), placed a two-year moratorium
on prepayments without HUD approval, and the Low-income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 601, 104 Stat. 4079, 4249 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 4101-4125 (2000)), made the moratorium permanent, giving HUD authority to create incentives for
owners to remain in the programs. See Herman, supranote 161, at 330-31.
163. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 194 F.3d 1231, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding no "privity
of contract" between owners and HUD as to prepayment rights contained in mortgage notes and riders).
164. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Cf Franconia
Assocs. v. United States, 536 U.S. 129, 142-43 (2002) (finding that enactment of ELIHPA constituted
repudiation of loan agreements in a Farmer's Home Administration loan program).
165. See Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 (MAHRA), Pub. L.
105-65, §§ 501-579, 111 Stat. 1344, 1384 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000)). The mark-to-market
program created by MAHRA gives providers at the end of their contract period various options to
restructure and refinance projects to encourage owners not to opt out.
166. 26 U.S.C. § 42(h)(6) (2000). The LIHTC compliance period was originally fifteen years, but
has now been extended to a minimum of thirty. See Leviner, supra note 124, at 873.
167. See, e.g., Massachusetts Regulatory Agreement, supra note 145, §6 (setting the term of the
regulatory agreement to ninety-nine years); see also Idaho Hous. & Fin. Ass'n, 2006 Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit Program Allocation Plan for the State of Idaho 14 (Dec. 15, 2005),
http://www.ihfa.org/pdfs/2006LIHTCQualifiedAllocationPlan.pdf (requiring that certain nonprofit setaside projects be "perpetually affordable," defined as lasting for the life of the property without major
rehabilitation or forty years); Md. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev., Maryland Low Income Housing Tax
Credit Program: Qualified Allocation Plan 1-2 (Jan. 2, 2004), http://www.dhcd.state.md.us/Website/
programs/rhf/document/2004qap.pdf (granting additional points in the allocation to developers agreeing
to an additional forty years on the use period). See generally Daniels & Nowakowski, supra note 136, at
83.
168. 26 U.S.C. § 142(d)(2)(A)(i) (2000); see Moore, supra note 125, at 616 (discussing LIHTC
"compliance periods" versus tax-exempt bond "qualified project period" requirements).
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from the general and open-ended 169 to the fine-grained and detailed. 17 Program

contracts can cover both overarching public policy goals beyond simply
providing housing, from the sweeping-such as affirmatively furthering fair
housing171-to the micro-level-such as complying with relocation assistance
172 undertaking affirmative action to employ lower-income
requirements,
17317
utilizing 175minority and women's business enterprises, 174 and
persons,
prohibiting lobbying.

A fairly clear picture thus emerges of the contingencies government entities
tend to address in these core agreements. Agency-drafted contracts frequently
specify general obligations on the part of the owner, and often in open-ended
terms that provide a measure of flexibility in operation. The primary reciprocal
obligation-that government entities provide the relevant subsidy-is likewise
at times accompanied by mechanisms of adjustment over time. In the broadest
sense, then, these agreements function as an acknowledgment on the part of the

private provider that it will be subject to regulation, that a number of key
obligations can only be captured in general, flexible terms, and that there are
176
contingencies in the long run that neither party can fully anticipate.
2.

Retained Discretionand the Gap-FillingFunction

If program agreements function in many ways as an acknowledgment of
regulatory oversight, a number of implementation issues can arise over the life169. In some instances, obligations imposed by contract are arguably broader than applicable
statutory provisions. See, e.g., MR HAP Contract Part 1, supra note 145, § 1.24.B (prohibiting
discrimination against "[u]nwed mothers" and "recipients of public assistance").
170. See, e.g., Old HAP Contract, supra note 144, § 1.9(b) (providing a formula for determining
tenants' security deposits); cf Office of Pub. & Indian Hous., U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Form
HUD-52530A, Project-Based Assistance Housing Choice Voucher Program-Housing Assistance
Payments Contract-New Construction or Rehabilitation § l .a (June 2001) (requiring leases that
follow "word-for-word" provisions required by HUD).
171. Old HAP Contract, supra note 144, § 2.1.b ("The Owner shall comply with all requirements
imposed by Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, and any rules and regulations pursuant thereto.").
172. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Form HUD-52524-B, Section 202 Project Assistance
Contract, pt. 2, § 2.16 (July 1990), http://ptp.hud.gov/reqdirect/ddsimage/3715.pdf [hereinafter 202
PAC] (citing the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42
U.S.C. § 4601 (1988), among other relevant statutory obligations).
173. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Form HUD-52539B, Housing Assistance Payments
Contract: Moderate Rehabilitation, pt. 2, § 2.1 (July 1984), http://www.hudclips.org/sub-nonhud/
html/pdfforms/52539-b.pdf [hereinafter MR HAP Contract Part II].
174. MR HAP Contract Part I, supra note 145, § 1.24.E (contractually obligating entities receiving
HUD subsidies to comply with Executive Orders Nos. 11625, 12138, and 12432).
175. Id. § 1.26; see also 202 PAC, supra note 172, § 2.18. HUD Handbooks can elaborate even
further. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Handbook 4350.1 Rev-I ch. 12 (Jan. 23, 1996),
http://www.hudclips.org/subnonhud/cgi/hudclips.cgi#handnot (select "all Handbooks," then search by
document number) (requiring certain projects to have and follow Energy Conservation Plans); see also
id. at 32-1 (elaborating on prohibitions against discrimination on the basis that tenants or their family
members own or keep a "common household pet").
176. Indeed, some agreements state this explicitly. See, e.g., Wisconsin Agreement, supra note 146,
at 2 (noting that the owner "by entering into this Agreement, consent[s] to be regulated by the
Authority").
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cycle of a subsidized development that are not explicitly addressed or made
subject to general reservations of government discretion. 177 For private

contracts, contractual ambiguity is resolved generally by mutual agreement,
judicial decision, or some form of alternative dispute resolution. 178 In
agreements with private parties, however, government entities retain significant
authority to define the terms of the relationship that exist outside of the express

and implied terms of the contract. In other words, program contracts often
implicitly leave many important long-term details to the exercise of agency
discretion. 179

In many instances, as noted, the relevant contracts reference the authority
granted to the government to define key terms, such as allowable rent levels, or

to approve or disapprove critical actions that owners might undertake with
respect to the project. Beyond that, in many ways, an equally if not more
important aspect of the contractual relationship is the authority to regulate
80
contingencies not contemplated or embodied in the formal agreement. 1
While administrative law scholars tend to focus on the link between
formality, agency power, and judicial deference, 181 these concerns have had
relatively little practical impact in the implementation of subsidized housing
programs. 182 Indeed, a significant percentage of agency pronouncements on
177. The extent to which agencies can use their governmental authority to redefine the terms of
their agreements (absent an explicit reservation of authority to do so) is significantly constrained by the
Contract Clause (on the state and local level) and by United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839 (1996), on
the federal level. See Freeman, supra note 4, at 209-10.
178. At least at the level of the "paper deal"--the formal terms embodied in the contract. In any
ongoing private contractual relationship, there will often also be the kind of informal mutual adjustment
that does not amount to renegotiation of the initial agreement. See Stewart Macaulay, The Real Deal and
the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and the Urgefor Simple Rules, 66
MOD. L. REV. 44,45-47 (2003).
179. In this sense, these agreements can be seen to deviate from some accounts of relational
contracts in the private sector. Cf Scott, supra note 87, at 849-51 (describing various private-sector
approaches to the enforcement of relational contracts). Government contracts leave relatively little room
for negotiation at the outset as to the scope of subsequent government authority to regulate
contingencies. While private parties clearly signal their willingness to agree to the allocation of risks
proffered by the government as a condition of the contract, this aspect of the public-private bargain
varies from the self-conscious, if constrained, negotiations presumed at the outset of private relational
contracts.
180. These contingencies can relate to anything from asset management (questions over the
permissible use of project funds), to tenant relations, to legal requirements that might arise outside of the
agency-provider relationship (such as rent control). The only certainty in a relationship that can last
decades is that questions will arise that cannot be anticipated at the time of initial contracting.
181. In other words, scholars tend to focus on the extent to which agencies can bind private parties
with pronouncements that are not the subject of notice-and-comment rulemaking or similar formality.
See, e.g., John Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 893, 937-39 (2004) (discussing
agency formality and judicial deference). The Supreme Court recently made clear that the absence of
notice-and-comment rulemaking, formal adjudication, or other indicia of agency formality downgraded
such agency pronouncements from Chevron deference to non-binding Skidmore deference, suggesting
that some degree of formality is required to bind private parties. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 226-35 (2001); see also Richard W. Murphy, A "New" Counter-Marbury: Reconciling
Skidmore Deference and Agency InterpretiveFreedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2004).
182. While conflicts can be resolved by judicial determinations of the binding nature of various
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which the private subsidized rental housing industry operates come not through
notice-and-comment rulemaking or other relatively formal processes, but
instead involve informal guidance.
For HUD programs, the agency operates under a bookshelf of handbooks,
which HUD and its private partners at times treat as functionally binding, even
if such guidance is not issued with any clear formality. 83 The agency
supplements this guidance with a fairly regular stream of general counsel and
program staff directives.' 84 Likewise, although the IRS regulations governing
the LIHTC program are detailed, 185 the IRS is frequently asked by members of
the LIHTC bar to clarify programmatic details through technical advisory
memoranda and private letter rulings.186 Unanticipated contingencies are often
resolved in this realm of informal guidance, vesting significant authority in the
government to redefine the expectations of the parties in the long run.
3.

OperationalNorms and IntermediateSanctions

Beyond informal agency guidance, another critical mechanism for defining
the long-term relationship between the government and providers can be found
in the implicit norms that guide day-to-day interactions not governed by the
explicit terms of the relevant agreements or gap-filling agency
pronouncements. 87 These informal contacts match what relational contract
theorists would describe as typical means of resolving conflicts in long-term

agency pronouncements, the infrequency of such challenges is notable.
183. This is not to suggest that conflicts over the binding nature of HUD and other agency guidance
never arise. The point is simply that given the number of projects under subsidy and the breadth of
public-private contacts such a portfolio engenders, one might expect much more friction over questions
of agency authority than seems to be the industry practice.
184. Just under the heading of "Housing," which covers multifamily programs such as projectbased Section 8, HUD's handbooks include thirteen volumes on topics ranging from the details of
program oversight to project-specific concerns including acceptable property insurance, tenant selection,
and management standards.
185. See generally 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.42-0 to -17 (2005) (describing credits allowable under Sections
30-45D); id. §§ 301.6401-1 to .6407-1 (describing procedures in general for abatements, credits, and
refunds).
186. To cite a recent high-profile example, the IRS in 2000 released five technical advisory
memoranda in connection with the audit of several LIHTC projects that clarified the agency's position
with respect to whether certain land preparation costs, construction loan and bond issuance costs, local
impact fees, and developer fees may properly be included in the eligible basis of a project, a critical
determinant of the level of the tax subsidy. See Jeffrey R. Pankratz & Craig Emden, Comment, Heard
from the IRS: IRS Rulings May Significantly Reduce Eligible Basis in Tax Credit Transactions, 10 J.
AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 99 (2001). The rulings, though informal, roiled the
industry, leading to calls for legislative revision and state agency oversight revisions. Id. at 99-100.
While this is an example of up-front tax treatment of costs not addressed by statute or regulation, the
need for clarification arose during field audits, id. at 100, and similar issues often arise during the
auditing process. Note that in the LIHTC and bond-finance context, the federal government and state
agencies share implementation, and there is an ongoing interaction between the IRS, state housing
agencies, and private participants.
187. On the relationship between norms and formal law, see generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
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188
intertwined agreements.

On the provider side, the primary recipients of public subsidies (or their
agents) 189 often maintain contacts with their government counterparts.19 They

do so both because of regular reporting and auditing requirements, and to raise
day-to-day management and operations questions that do not require formal
guidance. Over time, these contacts can establish patterns of governance in the
interstices between the agency pronouncements and the agreements that
formally define the relationship. If a question arises about issues such as the

permissible uses of a reserve fund, tenant qualifications, permissible
management agents, or other day-to-day operational aspects of project

ownership and management that
are not defined ex ante, consultation can
91

provide a first line of response.'
The development of the "rules" that govern the ongoing relationship

between government entities and providers in the subsidized housing context
can thus be driven by transaction-specific concerns arising from providers. As
new financing structures, changing market conditions, or developments in other
areas of the law raise questions about permissible courses of action not
previously addressed, the parties to development or preservation transactions

seek guidance from relevant government agencies, which are then called upon
to mhke formal or informal pronouncements on a case-by-case basis.192 The

resulting "common law" of program implementation is then spread through
networks of affordable housing developers, lenders, syndicators, investors, and
188. See supra text accompanying notes 102-103.
189. In the LIHTC and similar subsidy mechanisms, the entity or individual receiving tax benefits
rarely (except in the case of what is called "recapture") interacts directly with the IRS or any state
agencies about the program. Instead, the point of contact is often the developer who applies for
allocations of tax-credit authority that are then syndicated to investors.
190. There are reasons why providers might avoid entering into a dialogue with the government,
and there are certainly implementation issues in the interstices of clear obligations that providers resolve
without resort to consultation. The point here is simply that ambiguities and the reality that contracts and
the backdrop of the statutes and regulations against which they operate-in addition to regular contacts
through audits and the like-create an inevitable dialogue in the long run between providers and the
government.
191. In the HUD context, the Inspector General can also play a role in defining operational norms,
given the relatively broad authority granted to the Inspector General to investigate HUD programs. For a
general discussion of monitoring and oversight for both HUD subsidized and LIHTC projects, see
Deborah Kenn, Monitoring and Enforcement of Regulatory Agreements, in THE LEGAL GUIDE TO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT, supra note 120, at 363.
192. To cite one example, the relatively recent phenomenon of using limited liability companies as
ownership entities for private affordable housing projects, cf J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A.
SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 1.5, at 3 (1994) (detailing the history of enactment of LLC
legislation), raises practical questions given that most applicable statutes and regulations contemplated
individual, corporate or partnership forms of ownership (and often explicitly cite specific ownership
types). This has played out, among other areas, in HUD's process for determining previous
participation-the "2530 process," see infra text accompanying notes 196-200-which nowhere
mentions limited liability companies, causing confusion at a time when deal structures in the industry
are increasingly moving toward the use of LLCs. See Memorandum from Monica Hilton Sussman &
Richard Michael Price to Stillman D. Knight, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Multifamily Hous. Programs
(Mar. 26, 2004), availableat http://library.findlaw.com/2004/Apr/26/133420.html.

HeinOnline -- 24 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 296 2006

Relational Contracts

their counsel. 19 3 Again, this kind of informal interchange between contracting
1 94
parties is paradigmatically relational.
4.

Repeat Players and FeedbackMechanisms

Contractual obligations and non-contractual contacts in the subsidized
housing context operate against a background of repeat interactions that tend to
bring the same parties into subsidy programs. On the government side, agencies
such as HUD, recognizing that many providers are repeat players, have created

feedback mechanisms that reinforce fealty to agency goals by conditioning
future participation. 95 The so-called "2530" process (named after the relevant
HUD form) 196 requires potential recipients of many forms of HUD subsidy to

list all past involvement in affordable housing (involving any type of subsidy at
the applicant
any level of govemment), and to indicate whether, for example,
97
requirements.1
program
violated
or
loan
a
on
defaulted
has ever
While aimed at giving HUD the opportunity to screen for bad actors-a
genuine risk given the potential for individuals to mask previous participation
behind shifting entity structures-the 2530 process creates a practical day-to98
day feedback loop in the ownership and management of affordable housing.'
Providers who wish to be repeat players with HUD may exercise caution at the
which,
margins to avoid a 2530 "red flag,"' 99 which is difficult to remove-and
2
00
future.
the
in
HUD
with
working
of
process
the
slow
can
in any event,
193. In practice, private entities interact with the government in ways more subtle and complex
than this Article's focus on the bilateral agency-provider relationship suggests. For example, if HUD
makes a decision or sets policy to the detriment of a provider, that provider can seek redress elsewhere
in the executive branch (to the Office of Management and Budget, for example, which plays a role in
policy-making at HUD), as well as to Congress in its oversight capacity.
194. Similarly paradigmatic of relational contracting is the IRS and HUD's usage of penalties short
of termination (or the equivalent) to manage private providers. For example, under 26 U.S.C.
§ 4958(a)(1)-(2) (2000), the IRS has the power, in dealing with nonprofits, to issue intermediate
sanctions rather than terminate their tax-exempt status in cases involving private benefits, a situation that
can arise in the housing context.
195. From a "relational" perspective, the federal government also has the ability to suspend or even
debar providers from participating in federal subsidy and other programs. See Kenn, supra note 191, at
369.
196. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Form HUD-2530, Previous Participation Certification
(May 2001), http://www.hudclips.org/sub-nonhud/cgi/pdfforms/2530.pdf.
197. See Instructions to HUD Form 2530. See generally U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
Handbook 4065.1 Rev-1, Previous Participation Handbook (Sept. 21, 1994), http://www.hudclips.org/
sub nonhud/cgi/hudclips.cgi#handnot (select "all Handbooks," then search by document number)
(explaining the procedures for processing Form 2530).
198. The 2530 process is controversial in the housing industry, in part reflecting changes in the
structure of ownership from small partnerships and family members to large institutional investors. See
Memorandum from Monica Hilton Sussman & Richard Michael Price, supra note 192.
199. See 24 C.F.R. § 200.219 (2005) (on "red flags"); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.210 to .245
(2005).
200. For example, a provider may be facing a risk of foreclosure on an insured mortgage; rather
than "breach" (e.g., allow the project to fail, take the loss, and move on), providers have an incentive to
avoid the 2530 "red flag" that would accompany such a decision. Thus, interest in future subsidiescommon in the subsidized multifamily industry where there are numerous repeat players (indeed, where
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Background Legal Constraints

Finally, to complete the description of the mechanisms that shape the

government-provider relationship in subsidized housing, it is important to note
that in practice, private providers operate under a host of legal constraints that
mirror public law obligations. 201 For owners of multifamily housing, whether or
not they receive public subsidies, the role of landlord has famously taken on an
almost quasi-public tint, constraining the price (primarily through rent control)
and quality (through building codes, housing codes, and common-law doctrines
of the implied warranty of habitability)
of the housing, and granting to tenants
20 2
rights unavailable at common law.

The "revolution" in landlord-tenant law demonstrates the importation in the
private context (through both judicial and legislative action) of constraints that
would not be unfamiliar to government entities,

20 3

although the overlay is by no

2 4

means perfect. 0 Housing providers, moreover, are also subject to tort liability
and the ability of tenants to create obligations in leases, however tenuous that
ability might be in the markets in which subsidized housing tends to operate. In
short, over the duration of the contracts and other modes of control that shape

repeat players are often the only practical recipients of some of the more complex forms of government
subsidy, given the expertise required on the private side)-coupled with a formal mechanism to selfreport "bad actions" broadly speaking, can police actions that would be difficult to control through
formal contract.
201. In reviewing privatization as a general matter, Jack Beermann has argued with much force that
private-sector legal mechanisms restrain private actors in ways that parallel traditional governmental
restraints. Beermann cites judicial review of corporate management, the transparency-forcing
consequences of the regulation of public capital markets, and state oversight of nonprofit organizations
as examples of regulations that attempt in the private sector to give principals control of their agents'
behavior similar to administrative law's control over public entities. See Beermann, supra note 67, at
1720-29.
202. See Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 522-23 (1984). For examples of extensive commentary on
these developments in residential landlord-tenant law, see Lawrence M. Friedman, Comments on
EdwardH. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69
CORNELL L. REV 585, 585 (1984); Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American LandlordTenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REv. 503, 503-05 (1982). See also Gerald Korngold, Whatever Happened to
Landlord-TenantLaw?, 77 NEB. L. REv. 703, 705-07 (1998).
203. For example, one of the central battlegrounds in the development of "new property" due
process protections was in the arena of tenants' rights. See Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protection
and the Takings Clause, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 925, 928. A parallel hallmark of the revolution in landlordtenant law in the 1960s and 1970s was increasing constraints on the ability of private landlords to evict
tenants. See Rabin, supra note 202, at 521.
204. On the other hand, because public housing authority officials can in some circumstances claim
sovereign immunity, see, e.g., Evans v. Hous. Auth. of Raleigh, 602 S.E.2d 668 (N.C. 2004), tenants in
private subsidized housing may have stronger remedies available than do tenants in government-owned
housing for harms arising from the ordinary incidents of residential life. In many cases, public housing
authorities are found to have waived their sovereign or governmental immunity, at least for ordinary
torts, see, e.g., id. (remanding for a determination of possible waiver), but such immunity poses at least
an initial barrier for tenants seeking relief. Cf Beermann, supra note 67, at 1729-34; id. at 1733 (noting
the limits on imposing antidiscrimination norms on public actors and concluding that "privatization may
enhance the reach" of such norms by employing private actors more amenable to legal remedies than
public actors).
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the relationship between governments and private providers in subsidized
legal constraints not
housing, providers are governed by a number of 2significant
05
directly imposed in connection with the subsidy.
C.

Subsidized Housing as a Species of Relational Contracting
1.

Mapping Relational Patterns

In the paradigmatic privatization-as-discrete-contract case, a public entity
crafts a request for proposals, obtains bids from a relatively competitive market
of potential providers, sets out and negotiates the terms of the contract, and
then turns the private entity loose, subject to periodic monitoring and the threat
of potential termination. 20 6 This discrete-contracting vision of privatization
focuses largely on clearly defining terms up front and then deciding whether a
breach has occurred, often with short-term consequences (primarily
termination).
As a descriptive matter, the subsidized housing programs examined above
bear little resemblance to this vision. Although there is an element of discrete
contracting in the initial process of granting a subsidy in the programs
discussed above, in practice the "exchange" extends over numerous
interactions, bringing government agencies and their intermediaries into
repeated contact and raising the long-term need for fairly regular adjustment of
the terms of engagement. This interaction exemplifies key aspects of relational
contracting, explicitly recognizing the difficulty of embodying critical longterm obligations in clear-cut and inflexible terms, and creating mechanisms for
supporting the contractual relationship with a superstructure of formal and
informal interactions that fill gaps in the initial contracts. As noted, the terms of
respect to significant lifethe agreements tend to be relatively open-ended20with
7
cycle events, or even subject to explicit change.
As with relational contracts in the private sector, moreover, incentives to
breach are limited on both sides by significant sunk costs and incentives to
repeat the interaction. 2 0 8 As a result, informal mechanisms have developed to
205. In this regard, housing as an area of policy can be distinguished from some areas of social
welfare, such as benefits eligibility determinations, substance abuse treatment, and others in which
public law norms may be less prevalent in the private-sector analogues of public sector service
providers.
206. Joel Handler outlines the traditional model of contracting out. Handler's chronology begins
with requesting bids, selecting firms, and drafting, negotiating, and processing contracts; moves through
contract monitoring; and concludes with renewal (and, rarely, termination). See HANDLER, supra note 5,

at 90-93. Although Handler recognizes (and criticizes) the interdependency of government agencies and
the private providers they use, Handler's paradigm stages of contracting reflect an adversarial, arm'slength relationship that contemplates a fairly classical, discrete agreement.
207. See supratext accompanying notes 147-148.
208. Government entities are invested because they need private parties to provide housing;
providers are invested because that is their business or the mission of their nonprofit.
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resolve conflict, however imperfectly, and reinforce solidarity. 20 9 The "2530"
process is a prime example of an overarching mechanism that builds on the fact
that many housing providers are repeat players in subsidy programs, creating
incentives to meet program goals without explicitly mandating them. Even the
process of regulatory and informal agency-action gap filling-the commonlaw-like development of governing rules-reflects relational contracting by
building a process of adjustment internal to the relationship over time.
2.

BalancingFlexibility and Certainty

A relational contract lens brings to the fore the question of which aspects of
the government-provider relationship could best employ flexibility and which
aspects are best approached through more rigid terms. In the housing context,
some core aspects of the "service" can be memorialized in fairly concrete
terms, such as the number of units to be subsidized, the income limits of the
tenants who will occupy those units, and the amount of the tenant contribution
to rent. These basic determinants of the service are not likely to change over
contours of the transaction between the
time and can frame the broad
210
government and the provider.
On the other hand, there are myriad aspects of the government-provider
relationship in the housing context that agencies have tended to memorialize in
more flexible terms, including, as noted, terms relating to subsidy level,
housing quality, and various life-cycle events. These mechanisms for flexibility
recognize that as conditions change, both parties need to adjust. To the extent
that contractual obligations also track relevant public law norms, contracts take
approaches that vacillate between specificity and flexibility.
It is difficult to make generalizations about where the current balance
between flexibility and certainty might be adjusted, given that program
requirements vary significantly even within the confines of the programs this
Article has examined. Speaking broadly, one must account for the likelihood of
changing market conditions (both at the macro level and also in the local area
of a given project), the uncertainty of property conditions over the long run,
and the role that any one property may play in a larger portfolio of properties.
Balancing certainty and discretion must also take account of factors such as the
relative information to which providers and the government have access (and
each has distinct advantages in this regard), as well as the many practical
details of property ownership and management that translate program goals into
actual service.

209. See supra text accompanying notes 196-200.
210. Accordingly, flexibility is less useful as a tool in the original bidding for such basic terms.
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3.

Reserved Discretionin Operation

On one level, the agreements that frame the public-private interaction in
subsidized housing only imperfectly reflect relational norms. Were resources
available to anticipate and clearly articulate the allocation of risk for all future
contingencies, it would be theoretically possible to substitute the kinds of
mechanisms of governance described above with clear obligations. However,
given the practical fact that flexibility is necessary, an alternative response to
uncertainty over time as well as to the difficulty of capturing requirements in
precise terms is to implement mechanisms that foster mutual commitment and a
concomitant sharing of risks.
In subsidized housing, however, agreements frequently respond to change
and the vague nature of many requirements by functionally reserving unilateral
discretion to the government to approve significant adjustments and to fill gaps
left open by the four comers of the agreement. This phenomenon of
government retention of the ability to resolve ambiguity and decide issues not
covered by the stated terms of agreement, as well as some larger (however
limited) measure of authority to change the basic bargain, presents the risk that
the government will unilaterally change the "rules of the game." 21
' In housing,
as with most areas of policy, political conditions and programmatic goals
inexorably shift, sometimes dramatically, over time. This raises a particular
concern in housing policy, where public-private relationships might last thirty
212
or forty years or more.
One might suggest that if flexibility is necessary in the long run, a logical
response would be to allocate responsibility to one side or the other to resolve
inevitable ambiguities. Retaining unilateral discretion might not be a
dysfunctional response, but rather a simple way to provide for conflict
resolution in the long run. Only if the government exercises that discretion
improvidently, the argument would continue, is provider commitment
213
undermined. And, if discretion is retained by the sovereign partner in the
relationship, evolving public policy norms can be incorporated into the service
provision, rather than locked in at the time of contracting.

211. In the private-bargain context, there are a number of frameworks that might be employed for
resolving issues not controlled by the four comers of a written agreement, including efficiency, the
hypothetical bargain, and community norms. In privatization, the policy goals underlying the relevant
program theoretically provide a source of gap-filling principles. In other words, where contingencies
arise that are not covered by agreement or regulation, the remedial public purpose can supply a principle
for resolution-gap-filling rules that account for the policy being implemented.
212. Some of the central subsidy programs in the housing arena have evolved as legislative and
administrative priorities change. The example of Congress's decision to revisit the right to prepay
mortgages and hence remove affordability restrictions in the Section 221 (d)(3) and Section 236 context
is perhaps the starkest example, see supra text accompanying notes 161-165, but housing policy
constantly evolves. This leads to shifts, both subtle and significant, in the governance of most programs.
213. In other words, discretion in the government provides a framework, and in theory,
governmental entities have every incentive to exercise that discretion appropriately.
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Asymmetrical discretion, however, is not without cost. For one thing, the
uncertainty this generates in the long-term relationship can reinforce an
adversarial relationship between the government and providers, requiring
providers to bear a significant measure of the risk of change over time. 214 This
retained discretion, moreover, coupled with the open-ended terms of many
provisions in the governing contract, requires providers to seek approval for
even relatively mundane (but hard-to-predict) new conditions. This can
undermine the advantages in terms of responsiveness, creativity, and
experience that providers might bring to responding to front-line conditions that
are hard, if not impossible, to capture at the outset of the life of the project.
Recognizing these shortcomings, however, suggests strategies for improving
the relational aspects of privatization.
III.

EMBRACING RELATIONAL CONTRACTING IN PRIVATIZATION

If the emerging paradigm in public administration is "governing by
network, ''2 15 then the structural backbone of that network can be thought of as
the formal and informal agreements that define the relationship between
government entities and their private-sector counterparts. Arguments for
contractual clarity-essentially seeking to tighten that structure-are grounded
in a vision of government contracting that supposes a relatively discrete
transaction, focused largely on the initial act of provider selection, followed by
extensive contract oversight. However, as the examination of the subsidized
housing programs in Part II shows, government-provider contracts can emerge
that are better described as relational.
Thus far, the analysis has focused on uncovering the essentially relational
nature of the agreements that drive privatization in housing, a characteristic of
agreements in privatization that has been given relatively little attention in the
literature. This descriptive project, however, brings to the fore aspects of the
relational agreements that can be described as inchoate in terms of their onesided response to uncertainty. There is therefore a prescriptive element to this
analysis as well. One might fairly ask, if the current structure of housing
subsidies represents only a limited relational approach, why the response might
not be to scale back, limiting flexibility and eschewing collaboration in favor of
tighter control. This Part argues, however, that fostering mechanisms for longterm collaboration through strategies of mutual commitment, while perhaps
entailing the loss of some governmental discretion at the margins, could foster
214. The government also bears some measure of risk over time, no matter how much discretion it
retains to set the terms of long-term governance in a public-private relationship. As the opt-out crisis
involving Section 8 illustrates, see supra text accompanying notes 161-165, changing conditions can
create incentives for providers to exit subsidy programs. Moreover, the asset-specific investment made
by the government is a limiting factor in the exercise of its discretion as much as it is an element of risk
for the provider.
215. See GOLDSMITH & EGGERS, supra note 15, at 6-7.

HeinOnline -- 24 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 302 2006

Relational Contracts

a greater sense of solidarity to program goals on the part of private providers.
Returning to the evaluative framework set out in Part I, then, this Part
argues that more fully embracing a relational contracting approach has the
potential to enhance efficiency while providing an alternative response to the
risk that privatization poses to public law norms. It concludes with notes of
caution regarding relational contracting in privatization, and suggests responses
to such concerns.
A.

Strategies of Mutual Responsibility

Relational contracts reflect the inherent difficulty of capturing all
contingencies in a long-term relationship. Notions such as a duty to fulfill a
contract's terms in good faith-which is generally imposed on the government
in traditional procurement, at least at the federal leve121 6-show that muting the
risk of opportunism can reinforce the stability and vitality of the contractual
relationship, enhancing the gains to both parties to a long-term agreement. Such
notions at the core of relational contract theory suggest that government entities
have much to gain from giving up some measure of control in favor of fostering
the relational aspects of their oversight role.
1.

Credible Commitments

Oliver Williamson has argued persuasively that when parties engage in
long-term contractual relationships, particularly those defined by significant
investments in relationship-specific assets, mechanisms of mutual commitment
can temper the risk that the other party will exploit those investments. 2 17 For
Williamson, "credible commitments" to the contractual relationship foster
"more durable and specialized investments," yielding "superior" terms. 218 This
suggests that for privatization, tempering or2 19 moderating governmental
discretion may yield greater private commitment.
Adopting a strategy of fostering provider commitment by the government
entails a willingness to forego some measure of retained discretion. In the prepayment context, 220 for example, although the problem of allowing owners to
opt out is a serious one, the uncertainty and cost introduced into the industry by
a change in policy that arguably changed one of the basic elements of the

216. See 64 Am. JUR. 2D Public Works and Contracts § 107 (2005).
217. See WILLIAMSON, supranote 96, at 61.
218. Id. at 91. By credible commitments, Williamson means strategies such as reciprocal trading
that binds parties to a bilateral exchange more closely. The analogy in privatization would be
governmental approaches that change the incentive structure for private providers, given the risk that the
government might take advantage of providers' previous investments.
219. Id. at 268 ("Fewer degrees of freedom (rules) can have advantages over more (discretion)
because added credible commitments can obtain in this way.").
220. See supra text accompanying notes 161-165.
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"bargain" between the government and providers introduces an element of
instability in the relationship that makes it more difficult for the government to
induce future partnerships.
Equally important, seeking to foster mutual responsibility would require a
commitment by agencies in the long run to exercise the significant amount of
discretion they will inevitably retain with an eye toward reinforcing private
providers' ability to respond to conditions as they develop. Private
intermediaries might, for example, be empowered to participate in the process
of filling gaps left in agreements, with contractual provisions that provided
221
means of mutually adjusting terms in response to change over time.
From a relational contracts perspective, norms of reciprocity could fill the
gap left open by balancing the exercise of discretion. Foregoing discretion, of
course, has practical consequences on the government side. But the gains from
reducing government opportunism may preserve the private sector's ability to
respond flexibly to changing conditions while providing an alternative
222
mechanism to achieve the goals that the public partner seeks.
There may be instances, conversely, where it makes sense to increase the
discretion granted to the government. If, as William Kovacic has noted,
relational features inhere in all government contracts to some extent, the key to
realizing the potential of such relational features may be found in increasing
223
For
governmental flexibility to forego formal contracting requirements.
224
Kovacic, who is concerned primarily about regulatory mismatch, enhancing
the ability of regulators and procurement officials to "bend formal commands"
225
would provide them a tool to make regulatory regimes more efficient.
Kovacic acknowledges the potential for capture and fraud, but argues the
ability of agency officials to tailor private obligations in the face of potentially
over-inclusive nominal standards, like the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
to minimize efficiency losses by
in law enforcement, would allow agencies
226
targeting regulation to the specific context.
221. These mechanisms would seek to foster cooperation, the sharing of risk, and preservation of
the relationship. See Speidel, supra note 87, at 829; see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reconstructing
Construction Law: Reality and Reform in a TransactionalSystem, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 463, 535 (arguing
that relational contract "realities" in the construction industry argue in favor of promoting agreement and
good faith as primary contracting rules).
222. This is not to argue that agency officials have incentives to manipulate or exploit the private
providers with whom they interact, or to suggest that in practice they do so. Scandals in housing, as in
many other areas, tend to create an unfortunate public perception of corruption in an area of policy in
which literally millions of units have been provided with no taint of fraud or abuse.
223. See generally William E. Kovacic, Law, Economics, and the Reinvention of Public
Administration: Using RelationalAgreements To Reduce the Cost of ProcurementRegulation and Other
Forms of Government Intervention in the Economy, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 141 (1998).
224. Regulatory mismatch, according to Kovacic, is the proposition that regulation reduces
economic efficiency because of legislative and regulatory failures that lead to both regulatory over- and
under-inclusiveness. Id. at 149.
225. Id.
226. See id.
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In the context of social services, there are relatively few substantive
constraints on government power to shape the relationship with private
providers, as courts generally defer to agencies in the broad choices that go into
the structure of discretionary spending programs.2 2 7 There is a role for judicial
review in the implementation of any privatized service, and a rich literature is
developing on the grounds for such challenges, 228 but institutional design
229
questions have largely been left to agency discretion.
Government entities possess some measure of authority to tailor program
requirements to conditions as they arise, although a relational approach would
seek to increase that flexibility. Agencies can use that flexibility to harness
more effectively the expertise and perspective of private providers, while
inculcating and reinforcing dedication to program goals. Private providers, in
turn, can gain (or perhaps retain) the ability to adjust to conditions on the

ground. 23 In short, a relational approach can enhance the service and
231
responsiveness that obtains from engaging with the private sector.
2.

Accountability as Mutual Gain

Shifting from potential efficiency gains to concerns about preserving

accountability, a relational contracting perspective provides an alternative

227. See Cass, supra note 6, at 522 (noting that while the "law plainly offers a great many avenues
for possible challenge to privatization schemes," current legal doctrine, in general, "offers strikingly few
serious judicial obstacles to government disinvolvement, at least as long as accomplished through the
normal political processes"); Freeman, supra note 28, at 1305-06 (noting that "the implementation of
federal grants and run-of-the-mill discretionary funding decisions are not governed by the procurement
process and generally receive considerable judicial deference," and that the "bulk of privatization also
remains beyond the reach of the subconstitutional discretion-constraining and accountability-forcing
mechanisms of administrative law").
228. See, e.g., Gilman, supra note 18, at 626-40.
229. Paul Verkuil has recently explored in depth the internal structures the federal government has
established to guide outsourcing decisions, noting that administrative challenges to agency decisions to
contract out rarely succeed and judicial review (at least under the principal applicable public law
constraints, the Federal Activities Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 105-270, 112 Stat. 2382 (1998) (codified at
31 U.S.C. § 501 note (2000)), and the Office of Management and Budget's Circular A-76) has not been
a factor. See Verkuil, supra note 12, at 455-69. Cf Paul R. Verkuil, The Nondelegable Duty To Govern
(Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 149, 2005), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=871455.
230. There is a role for courts to play in reinforcing the relational aspects of the agreements that
frame privatization. Courts could, for example, give the parties room to develop the internal norms of
the relationship over time-for example, by allowing flexibility where relational norms should take
primacy, such as in the interpretation of regulations or of contractual provisions. Courts could also
bolster governmental strategies of commitment by holding the government to the broad terms of the
original bargain. In other words, reversing the normal deference granted to agencies at the margins
under an analysis similar to that the Supreme Court employed in United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839
(1996), courts could temper governmental discretion to alter the basic bargain while at the same time
increasing the tools available to public and private partners to adjust the "details" over time.
231. This is not to make the empirical assertion that in all situations or under all conditions,
introducing balanced and flexible mechanisms will necessarily enhance the services provided-here,
more and better housing at less cost. Rather, with recognition of the significant empirical debate about
the efficiency of potential privatization writ large, see supra note 35, my aim here is to argue more
modestly that there is sufficient promise in the approach that it is worth exploring further in practice.
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framework for preserving public law norms in service provision. In terms of
mechanisms of accountability situated in the government-provider interface, a
discrete-contracting approach yields prescriptions for contractual specificity
and vigilant monitoring in order to exercise the sanction of termination in the
event private providers do not fulfill the public norms underlying the program.
A relational approach, however, recognizes that public law norms are
inherently difficult to capture in contractual terms and likewise that the risk of
shirking---doing what is minimally required by contract-is ever-present.2 32 In
response, a relational approach would seek to inculcate public values in the
private partners the government employs, not as much through ever-increasing
contractual specificity (or other tools that have been suggested for making
private parties more "government-like" 233) as through formally and informally
encouraging reciprocity and private-party solidarity to public values.
In the process of selecting providers, in the ensuing contracts, and in the
interactions that follow, public officials could reorient their approach to make
fidelity to core public values as important an aspect of private conduct as any
"hard" output. This reorientation-from focusing on oversight to focusing on
that interaction from
strategies of mutual commitment-can shift the basis of
234
problem-solving.
mutual
of
one
to
an adversarial posture
The advantages that this shift would bring in terms of efficiency make
intuitive sense-to the extent that private-sector actors have advantages in the
provision of services, engaging them collaboratively should facilitate the
engagement with those advantages. But recognizing the value of flexibility and
long-term collaboration has the potential as well to reorient frames of
accountability. 235 Rather than continue to conceive of accountability as the
ability of an agency to impose requirements on private parties (which will
always be necessary for practical aspects of the service provision and, for more
open-ended public law norms, in the marginal case as well), accountability in
this context can be thought of as the mutual responsibility of government and

232. See SCLAR, supra note 3, at 122; see also id. at 128 (noting that if agencies focus too heavily
on specifications, "they stand a good chance of getting precisely what they [seek] regardless of whether
it is what the situation truly warrants").
233. Other tools to make private providers more "government-like" include increased liability and
reduced immunity. See Freeman, supra note 28, at 1315-28; see also Freeman, supra note 27, at 574-91
(describing four traditional constraints advocated by administrative law scholars to constrain private
parties performing governmental functions: treating private parties as "state actors"; enforcing nondelegation or due process constraints on the involvement of private parties; extending procedural
controls to private actors; and infusing private law with public law norms).
234. Cf.Jody Freeman, CollaborativeGovernance in the AdministrativeState, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1,
24 (2000) (discussing the advantages of collaboration to the regulatory process, and noting that
sustained interaction is "likely to ameliorate the adversarialism of stakeholder relationships," which can
be instrumental in fostering "trust and good faith").
235. Cf Korman, supra note 84, at 294 ("[A] housing provider that is attentive to civil rights
concerns has substantial discretion in choosing the methods deemed necessary to fulfill the
responsibility to further fair housing.").
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236

Ensuring that a private agent's interests are aligned with the public partner
is a significant challenge. Shirking on the part of the private party in the face of
overly narrow commands, the reality of ever-more limited oversight resources,
and the practical challenges in memorializing the full range of potential
contingencies in long-term relationships all suggest that preserving
accountability through ever-greater contractual clarity may simply not be
feasible. Focusing instead on increasing provider commitment to public ends,
while leaving that private party greater discretion to experiment
with
237
appropriate means for reaching those ends, can accomplish both goals.
Shifting from the incentives to operate within the constraints of public
norms to the content of those norms, a relational perspective could also provide
a filter through which to assess which public law norms to impose in the first
place. 23 A relational perspective can sharpen administrative and legislative
decisions about the range of public law norms that should be operative, a
process that currently occurs largely in a piecemeal fashion. Resisting the loss

236. Cf Freeman, supra note 234, at 30 ("A collaborative regime challenges existing assumptions
about what constitutes public or private roles in governance because the most collaborative
arrangements will often involve sharing responsibilities and mutual accountability that crosses the
public-private divide.").
237. Reaching a similar conclusion from a different direction, Henry Korman has argued forcefully
for what he calls an "underwriting" approach to the civil rights aspects of the public values involved in
providing affordable housing, making fair housing duties an aspect of the provider's orientation at every
stage of the development and management process, in the same way that agencies now underwrite for
financial obligations. See Korman, supra note 84, at 313. For Korman, placing what could be called the
"civil rights risk" on a par with financial and management risks would incentivize private providers and
other relevant stakeholders to develop and operate housing with greater sensitivity to these public
values, while drawing on the "substantial latitude" that providers have "to determine the nature and
scope of appropriate action." Id.
238. It might be argued that the appropriate locus of responsibility for deciding the relevant public
values to be imposed on any private provision of public services is the recipient of that service, as
reinforced by judicial remedies in the case of recalcitrant providers. In other words, private providers
should be subject to the full range of remedies by program participants that public providers would be.
As noted above, supra note 204, private actors in certain circumstances may be more amenable to the
type of accountability represented by liability to recipients.
There is, however, a deeper concern here. There may be instances in which the definition of relevant
public values that results from the political process-that is, imposed by public entities on private
providers as a matter of contract, regulation, or other law-varies from the public values that recipients
might choose. Cf Moore, supra note 26, at 1220 ("If a collective defines public purposes by acting
through political, legislative, executive, and judicial means, then values, purposes, and goals defined in
these processes become a different standard for judging what is publicly valuable than the simple
aggregation of the welfare of those affected by the public policies."). Residents, for example, might have
a different view than public officials about the appropriate balance between tenant screening
mechanisms and tenant security. A controversial variation on this conflict recently played out with
respect to permissible grounds for eviction in public housing. See HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002).
Without taking a position on whether the HUD policy upheld in Rucker went too far on the side of
security, the case illustrates the potential for a rift between visions of appropriate operating norms that
the government might choose and that some clients might choose. It is beyond the scope of this Article
to evaluate fully the specific public values at play in subsidized housing, let alone the privatization of
social welfare writ large. But it is important to acknowledge the potential gap between collectively
defined public values and recipient-derived public values.

HeinOnline -- 24 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 307 2006

Yale Law & Policy Review

Vol. 24:263, 2006

of public values while strengthening appropriate public norms in privatization
between efficiency
risks a series of question-begging exercises, and the 2tradeoff
39
vacuum.
a
in
evaluated
be
cannot
and accountability
As noted above, in the housing programs at issue, "publicization" reflects
both sweeping obligations (such as equality- and due-process-grounded
protections for tenants) and more particular obligations. 240 Deciding which of
these obligations best enhances the ultimate provision of service, and reinforces
the private providers' incentives to deliver the "best" service (defined as the
cost, and quality), can be focused through a
optimal mix of constraints,
24 1
relational contract lens.
From an accountability standpoint, in sum, relevant public law normssuch as anti-discrimination provisions and notions of rationality in the selection
and retention of tenants-are appropriately imposed in open-ended terms. The
ability of any contract (or regulatory) drafter to provide a complete normative
program is inherently limited given the variety of case-specific and often novel
applications in which such norms must apply over the life of a project. In a
public policy environment of severely limited resources, therefore, strategies
that extend the reach of public law norms while not transforming the publicprivate relationship into one that essentially replicates public provision deserve
serious consideration.
3.

Mechanisms of Collaboration

What might a more collaborative approach look like in practice? Because
this Article has focused on a collection of specific housing programs, and

because operational details are critical and vary greatly from program to
program, it is appropriate to limit this inquiry to the subsidized housing context.
239. Freeman argues that imposing public law norms might turn on the extent to which a program
involves value-laden judgments in implementation. See Freeman, supra note 28, at 1349-50. An
examination of subsidized housing suggests that that line might be a difficult one to discern in practice.
Deciding which tenants to accept into government-funded housing, for example, is arguably as valueladen as any exercise of discretion over the decision to extend or deny a governmental benefit, but the
myriad details of HUD and IRS program guidance focus as well on pragmatic concerns like housing
quality, conditions of secondary financing, approval for transfer and the like.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 169-175.
241. A relational contracting approach to privatization might also blunt the concern that attempting
to inculcate public values-particularly non-discrimination norms and tolerance for individual beliefsin religious entities who act as social service providers itself undermines the unique nature of such
entities. Kathleen Sullivan, for example, has argued that just as the freedoms of speech, association, and
religious practice limit the government's ability to impose certain norms on religious entities directly, so
too should the concerns animating those constitutional protections limit government's ability instead to
"bribe" those entities though vouchers and contracts. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and
the Constitution, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1397, 1397, 1420-21 (2003). While the substance of the "strings"
that might accompany public funding in a relational approach might look little different than the
substance that could be attached through a more discrete-contracting model, the larger social and
institutional framework in which the collaboration between private (religious) and public entities occurs
could provide greater sensitivity to the distinctive nature of religious entities and help temper some of
the potential excesses that injecting religion into social service provision risks.
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Collaborative mechanisms that embrace a relational contracting perspective
likely apply in other areas of social welfare policy, but the exploration of such
mechanisms must be sensitive to context.
To begin, under a relational contracting approach, public-private
agreements could share the burden of decisionmaking over time. When
providers seek approval from government entities in response to changing
conditions on the ground-say, for the need for additional financing or to
attempt a creative approach to marketing in response to new population
needs-they could be provided with some assurance of a response by
government entities in a timely manner and perhaps a shift in the burden of
proof. Currently, for those issues where discretion is retained by the
government, the exercise of that discretion is often triggered by provider input
and the burden remains on providers to show why a given course of action
should be allowed. Even if an agency can be convinced, the need to do the
convincing may deter creativity and responsiveness. If providers knew the
range of likely outcomes, or had some confidence that balanced mechanisms
existed to resolve disputes, then that would encourage providers to take
initiative in the first place.
A relational contracting approach, moreover, could reallocate some
measure of the risk of change over time to the government, giving providers a
greater measure of certainty at the time of contracting as to what the rules of
the game would be over the lifetime of the public-private partnership. This
might involve explicit contractual provisions that lock in some set of core
governing rules-say, the regulations in place at a given time-or that place
some burden on the government's ability to change those rules. Alternatively, if
policy shifts and providers are to be subject to new requirements, then some
offsetting benefit might be granted to induce providers to incorporate those new
norms. 242

Another governance mechanism to reinforce provider solidarity in the face
of inherent uncertainty is for agencies to focus resources on non-contractual
measures that reward the internalization of public law norms by providers. The
2530 process, for example, was designed to screen "bad actors" but has had the
secondary effect of deterring undesirable behavior by the repeat players that
populate the industry. Similar mechanisms could formally reward good
behavior. Examples could include giving points or other advantages in
competitions for subsidies to providers who demonstrate commitment to
program goals, 243 or providing other concrete incentives to providers to pay
242. This is essentially the approach that Congress has reached in the pre-payment context, after
years of conflict, see supra note 165. Despite the genuine threat of losing the subsidized portfolio, the
current collaborative approach has met with much success.
243. HUD, for example, conducts surveys of some residents to assess satisfaction with issues such
as the level of maintenance, repair, and appearance of developments, as well as communications, safety,
and services provided. See U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Customer Satisfaction Survey (Mar. 14,
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attention to delivering housing in ways that go beyond the level minimally
required. 24
These examples are just that-speculations as to appropriate governance
mechanisms that might advance the public-private collaboration in light of the
relational nature of the interaction. They must be tested on the ground and in
practice and undoubtedly there are many other appropriate mechanisms that
agencies and providers could develop. The important point is to firmly plant the
focus of governance on best responding to uncertainty, creating mutual
responsibility, and incentivizing private providers to advance public goals.
B.

Notes of Caution

If viewing at least some forms of privatization as creating a species of
relational contract has the potential to yield efficiency gains while providing an
alternative set of approaches to preserving accountability to public law norms,
why is the model not more prevalent in practice? Several barriers to long-term
relational collaboration are evident in the context of subsidized housing, and
may have wider application. First, the ever-present risk of capture and
corruption, certainly no stranger to the world of affordable housing, suggests
caution. Next, the fact that a government entity frames and largely controls the
interaction underscores the inherent imbalance of the contracting parties,
potentially undermining relational norms. And the mismatch in incentives
between public and private actors may likewise undermine the ability of the
parties to commit to shared responsibility. Finally, any effort to work more
collaboratively may stretch scarce agency resources. All of these concerns
deserve attention, but ultimately should not undermine the promise that a
relational contract approach holds.
1.

Fearof Captureand Corruption

Perhaps the most significant impediment to collaborative models of publicprivate partnerships is the potential for capture and the risk of public
corruption. 245 If the government foregoes discretion and commits to
collaboration that is genuinely mutual, such loss of control might invite abuse
2006), http://www.hud.gov/offices/reac/products/prodrass.cfm. HUD could modify this type of feedback
into broader instruments to track sensitivity to the norms that the agency decides are most important and
use that information when selecting providers to subsidize.
244. There are a variety of tools that one can envision serving a similar feedback-loop function.
The right, for example, to get certain levels of development fees might be conditioned on the uses to
which those fees are put, and a sliding scale could be employed to encourage reinvestment in affordable
housing. Or eligibility for relief from "exit taxes"-potential capital gains and depreciation recapture
that accompany the sale of many older buildings-might likewise be conditioned on commitments to
preserve such housing. See MILLENNIAL HOus. COMM'N, supra note 116, at 34 (endorsing a form of this
proposal).
245. See Kovacic, supra note 223, at 148-49.
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by private partners. Likewise, the absence of any pre-defined and publicly
announced standard to be applied may undermine the public's ability to detect
and deter fraud. In other words, the lack of transparency that inheres in
relational exchanges shifting over time raises the risk of outright corruption:
The less clear (and clearly enforced) the norms that govern the public-private
relationship, the greater the risk of fraud.
HUD's track record with capture and fraud in privatization is certainly not
without its unfortunate blemishes, 246 leaving a legacy of heightened concerns
247
about corruption.
The government, however, retains a significant array of
tools to deal with "waste, fraud and abuse," and extra-contractual enforcement
mechanisms pervade even the most detailed contractual relationship. 248 The
HUD Inspector General, for example, has broad investigative and remedial
250
authority 249 and has rarely been hesitant in exercising that authority.
Likewise, the IRS audits LIHTC projects regularly, and compliance monitoring
for tax-credit projects has spawned an industry of consultants.
One could argue that clear benchmarks and the limitation of discretion will
tend to be more effective than ex-post mechanisms to minimize the risk of
fraud. As long as relational practices are grounded within the broad confines of
acceptable agency discretion and are subject to review through ordinary agency
oversight, the risk of shifting to ex-post enforcement should not stand as an
insuperable barrier to effective public-private collaboration. In short,
collaboration need not mean corruption: While capture and fraud are always
risks in the private provision of public services, those risks alone should not
obscure the potential for embracing flexibility and creativity in long-term
contractual relations.
2.

InherentImbalance

Another barrier to shifting to a relational contracting model for
privatization is the inherent imbalance between contracting parties. Some
degree of a disparity is theoretically present in all contracts, but it is more
pronounced when a sovereign is on one side of the bargaining table. 251 Scholars

246. See Michael Allen Wolf, HUD and Housing in the 1990s: Crises in Affordability and
Accountability, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 545 (1991).

247. Following a series of scandals at HUD during the Reagan administration, Congress passed the
Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-235, 103 Stat.
1987 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3531 note (2000)), containing a number of provisions aimed at reforming
HUD's ethics and management.

248. See Kovacic, supra note 223, at 150-51.
249. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. at 12 (2000).
250. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: OCTOBER 1, 2004 THROUGH MARCH 31, 2005 (2005), available at

http://www.hud.gov/offices/oig/sar53.pdf (detailing the work of the HUD Inspector General's Office).
251. In many instances, of course, private parties have informational advantages over public
entities that can skew the negotiation of a public-private contract. See SCLAR, supra note 3, at 121
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focused on the intersection between relational contracts and the government
have generally been concerned with the risk of opportunism that arises where
one party to the bargain-the government-is also the institution charged with

enforcing the contract.252 Opportunism, even if reflecting a benign reaction on
the part of the government to shifting public policy priorities, can threaten the
confidence of private parties that the terms of the engagement will remain

stable over time, undermining incentives to do more than what is minimally
required by contract.
Moreover, relational norms may be hard to inculcate in a relationship where
the government, as it must, retains an array of regulatory and other means to
reinforce its control. 253 Incentivizing private parties to embrace program goals
not strictly required by contract may be challenging. 254 Government entitiesat least outside of procurement, which is much more tightly regulated than
many of the contexts in which social services privatization such as subsidized
housing occurs2 55-have authority to temper their own prosecutorial discretion
and target limited resources on resolving problems cooperatively before they
become the subject of enforcement actions.
In a relational contracting paradigm, while government entities would not
give up their ability to sanction private intermediaries, they might see some

value in reserving enforcement for situations in which cooperation had broken
down. Of course, clear violations of law should merit enforcement, but in the
day-to-day operations of many privatized public services, there are significant

gray areas and room for the exercise of government discretion.

("Even the most conscientious public officials are almost always systematically on the short end of
informational asymmetry inequality."). This may be less so in an area of privatization such as housing,
where there are constraints on the ability of housing providers to manipulate information advantages,
given that subsidies are only a part of most projects (and hence other stakeholders, such as lenders and
investors, can police construction and management costs).
252. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, RelationalExchange, 23 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 337 (1980); Todd S.
Lowry, Bargain and Contract Theory in Law and Economics, 10 J. ECON. ISSUES 1 (1976). For an
extended case study in state opportunism, and the argument that political and economic forces make
governments problematic participants in relational contracts, see Grandy, supra note 105.
253. Some HUD contracts, for example, include warnings about potential criminal liability arising
out of false statements. See, e.g., Housing Assistance Payments (HAP) Contract, Section 8 Housing
Assistance Payments Program: Additional Assistance Program for Projects with HUD-Insured and
HUD-Held Mortgages, § IV (June 1992) (citing monetary penalties and potential imprisonment for
violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001), in U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Handbook 4350.2 Rev-1, app. 15
(Aug. 20,
1993), http://www.hudclips.org/sub-nonhud/cgi/hudclips.cgi#handnot
(select
"all
Handbooks," then search by document number); MR HAP Contract Part 1, supra note 145, at 21
(invoking 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000)).
254. Put starkly, "[s]o long as one partner to the relationship has the ability to imprison employees
of the other partner and insists on deputizing the employees of the other partner [through qui tam suits]
to monitor deviations from various rules, reliance on relational commitments is likely to be reduced."
Kovacic, supranote 223, at 154.
255. Cf Freeman, supra note 4, at 160 n. 18 (noting that "the law governing traditional government
procurement of goods and services addresses only a narrow subset of government contracts," and is
"either imperfect or wholly unsuitable for responding to the more widespread use of contract to deliver
services or perform arguably public functions").
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The flip side of relaxing these structural barriers is the risk that applying the
kind of flexibility that characterizes relational contracts unfairly bends the
rules. If the government adjusts the relationship on a relational basis-issues a
waiver of some requirement, for example-then the failure to provide a similar
waiver in like cases raises serious questions.
As a practical matter, HUD and other agencies already possess authority to
waive some program requirements, 256 and are certainly called upon to exercise
that discretion already. What a relational contract perspective would suggest,
however, is that exercising such authority more judiciously might enhance the
incentives that private parties have to innovate within the framework of
program goals.
3.

Skewed Incentives

The structural impediment to relational contracting arising from the
imbalance between the partners also arises in the incentives of the contracting
parties. Principals and agents always face a potential mismatch in incentives;
but providing complex and highly contextual services over a period of decades,
while advancing sometimes abstract public values, poses particularly sharp
challenges. The longer the term of the contractual relationship, the more risk
that initially aligned interests will grow apart. Private providers-both forprofits and, to a lesser extent, non-profits-rarely place the advancement of
public values at the center of their incentive structure, undermining the ability
of the parties to commit to increasing solidarity to achieve such values. 257 In the
commercial context, the underlying goal of all parties is relatively clear and
translatable (in some form) into financial terms. In the public sector, at least
where social services are concerned, the need to be sensitive to public values
and the essentially redistributive nature of258
social welfare make the mutual gains
of the parties potentially incommensurate.
An answer to this challenge may lay in the long-term and repeat nature of
the interaction between the parties in privatization. As discussed above, the
government in some instances has created mechanisms that have the effect of
incentivizing providers to avoid the reputational and practical burdens of
undesirable behavior. Programs could conversely structure the public-private
relationship affirmatively to reward actions that reflect the government's goals.
256. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R § 5.110 (2005) (HUD waiver authority).
257. Cf Minow, supranote 24, at 1249.
258. It is also important to note that while this discussion has generally focused on mechanisms for
enhancing efficiency while providing an alternative way to think about promoting accountability, the
discussion has assumed as a baseline that government fealty to public law norms can be assumed.
Particularly in the social welfare context, elected officials in different administrations, at least at the
federal level, may take different views of the value of certain public goals. That can raise a type of
mismatch not generally considered above, where the private provider is taking what might be considered
a more public-oriented view than the government.
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Indeed, with for-profit private partners, recognizing that the profit motive is
central to the private party's goals may lead to mechanisms that harness that
profit motive for public gain. The government could build on the kinds of
feedback mechanisms currently in place to create incentives for repeat players
to undertake the myriad daily operational decisions that make up service
provision in a way that demonstrates, in the long run, commitment to the public
goals at issue.
Another response can be found in the selection and screening mechanisms
that governments employ to decide with whom to enter into the kinds of longterm collaborations at issue. Mission-driven nonprofit entities, for example,
may have distinct advantages in this regard over for-profit entities, although
even within the for-profit sector there are entities that are likely to be more
appropriate long-term partners. Laura Dickinson has argued in this vein that
third-party accreditation can provide an effective tool to enhance norms of
accountability internal to a given industry. 259 A similar mechanism in the
housing privatization context-an industry set of clear best practices for the
development and operation of affordable housing, with an accompanying
accreditation mechanism-could provide a tool through which the government
260
could filter participation.
4.

Resource Constraints

Finally, it could be argued that a relational approach would require
government entities to devote more of their extremely limited resources to
managing relationships outside of a framework of standardized contractual
control. 261 With limited staff and significant portfolios to monitor, it might be
better to focus on standard forms and audit triggers that ease administration and
reduce transaction costs compared to more flexible mutual engagement.262
A relational approach, however, need not necessarily entail greater public
costs. It is at least plausible that the expenditure of resources to create
structures of governance that incentivize private providers to pursue public
goals would be less expensive in the long run. This is an empirical question

259. See Dickinson, supra note 11, at 175-76. 1 thank Laura Dickinson for this suggestion.
260. The longer the relationship to which the government is committing, the more important is the
selection of the contracting partner in the first place.
261. Cf Verkuil, supra note 12, at 439 (discussing concerns with the capacity of governmental
entities to ensure that their contracts are properly enforced).
262. In this view, to husband scarce resources, agencies that subsidize housing should essentially
be reactive. After setting up the initial conditions under which private providers are to operate, agencies
should intervene only to correct material deviations from such conditions. However, given the likelihood
that the management of a typical private housing project will require government approval or consent
(for issues such as changes in management agencies, distributions, dispositions, and many other turning
points in the life-cycle of the asset), see supra text accompanying notes 147-148, agencies already
interact on a fairly active basis with the projects they oversee. The question is how to approach that
interaction.
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beyond the scope of this Article, but the long-term, intertwined nature of the

public-private relationship suggests that any structure successfully aligning
interests rather263than imposing requirements at least carries the potential for
reducing costs.

CONCLUSION

Privatization has become a permanent public policy fixture. The practice is
only going to accelerate, as governments at all levels stretch increasingly thin
resources to meet vital public needs. It is thus imperative to explore how to

make the promise of privatization real while mitigating the potential risk to
public values. Given the limits of contractual specificity and enforcement in
long-term, complex public-private partnerships, shifting to a collaborative
model that privileges mutual responsibility is well worth exploring. If enlisting
the creativity and experience of private providers to solve problems in the
implementation of social welfare policy can enhance the capacity of
government entities to provide critical services, then the kinds of incipient

relational norms evident in subsidized housing deserve greater recognition.
This is not to say that embracing a relational model requires unilateral
disarmament on the part of the government. Government entities must retain

critical enforcement authority, and private providers will always operate in a
web of accountability mechanisms. But government entities can craft and
manage agreements that enhance the positive role that private providers can

play as long-term partners. A more balanced approach would foster reciprocal
commitment on the part of private providers to promote public ends.
Context, of course, is critical. This Article has focused on one set of

housing programs, representing one approach to privatization, and a particular
set of normative and practical conditions. No doubt some of the relational

aspects of the agreements examined in this Article are unique to this area of
263. Beyond the structural and other barriers to embracing a relational contracting model, there is
an independent set of concerns that might arise in terms of the risk to the private sector of everincreasing public involvement. This concern is often for nonprofit entities that, by this account, have to
mold their structure and goals to meet governmental expectations, warping the independence of the
private provider and diminishing the social capital that such independence brings. See, e.g., Frumkin,
supra note 3, at 198.
This is far from a trivial concern. Shifting from a discrete-contract paradigm, with its emphasis on
contractual specificity and focus on government remedial control, to a relational contract paradigm that
seeks to inculcate public values on the part of the private party may actually preserve more
independence for those entities that choose to enter into public-private partnerships. While the goal of a
relational contract perspective is to align incentives and reinforce the private parties' fidelity to public
goals, the means through which public goals can be reached would be left to a greater extent to the
private side of partnership. For entities that choose to provide governmental services, retaining a
relatively greater scope of operational control may shore up independence. In other words, many of the
more onerous oversight provisions that raise concerns about co-opting the private sector spring from the
fear of a mismatch between public and private goals. The greater the potential disconnect, the more
control the government seeks to assert. If alternative means of creating incentives for private parties to
achieve public goals were brought to the fore, independence could be enhanced.
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policy and the market in which it operates. But given the practical challenges
that contractual control poses and the long-term nature of many public-private
partnerships, it is well worth examining-and, with appropriate caution,
embracing-the relational features that might be found in government's
engagement with the private sector.
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